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ABSTRACT 
The system of interest (SOI) for this research centers on the mission of a friendly 
Blue Force (BF) controlling the enemy Red Force’s (RF) influence on a strategic, 
bottleneck trade route and the execution of the kill chain functions performed by the BF 
during the conflict that ensues. The kill chain function of “finding the RF threat” is 
conducted by the BF’s Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR), the function of 
“targeting the RF threat” is performed by the BF’s decision maker, and the function of 
“engaging the RF threat” is conducted by the BF’s shooter. There are multiple messages 
exchanged between the BF’s ISR, decision maker, and shooter during execution of the 
kill chain functions and a recognized need to improve the command and control 
(C2) responsiveness while performing cooperative engagements to ensure 
overmatch of a near peer enemy by 2030, when naval unmanned surface vessels are 
predicted to join the fleet. 
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This capstone examines the combination of an improved cooperative engagement 
capability (CEC) and command and control (C2) for an adaptive force package (AFP) 
operating within a Distributed Maritime Operation’s (DMO) location. This research 
examines four important entities of the CEC. First, a complete CEC has an observer 
capable of identifying the precise location of a potential target. In the missile threat 
environment, the precision of location detail must be extremely high and updated many 
times per second. This functional element will be categorized as the observer/ISR or sensor 
function. Second, a complete CEC has the capability to exchange this high-fidelity, target-
quality data from the Observer/ISR platform to other participating platforms. Third, a 
complete CEC has a firing platform with a munition capable of successfully prosecuting 
the observed target. Fourth, a complete CEC has a decision support/decision making 
capability where the human decision maker interfaces with the system and expresses his or 
her weapons release authority. The combination of the observer/ISR, decision maker, and 
shooter will be referred to throughout the paper as the lethal triad. 
This research centers on the mission of a friendly Blue Force (BF) controlling the 
enemy Red Force’s (RF) influence on a strategic, bottleneck, trade route and the execution 
of the kill chain functions performed by the BF during the conflict that ensues. The kill 
chain functions of finding, targeting, and engaging the threat are conducted, respectively, 
by the BF observer, decision maker, and shooter. There are multiple messages exchanged 
between the lethal triad during execution of the kill chain functions and a recognized need 
to increase the C2 responsiveness while performing CEC to ensure overmatch of a near 
peer enemy by 2030 when naval unmanned surface vessels are predicted to join the fleet. 
Proposed lethal triad interoperability improvements for shortening current C2 
cycles during the kill chain execution include digitization of typically analog messages 
relayed between the lethal triad, radio messaging translation from one protocol to another, 
automation of the best solution for the lethal triad and incorporation of MADL-like 
communications similar to that used on the F-35. The implementation of these 
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improvements on every platform should allow for the creation of a distributed, AFP, ad-
hoc mesh.  
Of utmost importance are the effects that shortening the C2 cycle should have on 
the kill chain and the outcome of a battle. The kill chain benefits should include faster, less 
jammable communication between the lethal triad; more responsive, reliable decision 
making in a highly contested environment; and improved matching of weapon systems to 
threats which should culminate in a more appropriate and effective ad hoc, self-forming 
AFP. 
Capability and functional models of the proposed improvements have been 
developed along with a simulation of the mission scenario using various combinations of 
the BF lethal triads attacking and defending against the enemy RF weapon systems with 
realistic weapon system parameters incorporated including unmanned. The simulation data 
collection and analysis results indicate a 5.9 % to 6.4% increase in survivability of the BF 
while implementing the proposed JCEC C2 interoperability improvements with the 
greatest improvements due to automated decision making. Additional data also indicates 
that accelerating the kill chain via JCEC C2 improvements allows for as many as 12 
additional BF munitions to become available for fire and for 4.6 additional RF munitions 
to be destroyed, thus acting as a form of BF multiplier. BF loses are also reduced by 12.6%. 
These results indicate that by improving interoperability among the lethal triad and 
by improving human decision making through automation, war fighter lives can be saved 
because less BF platforms are lost and overmatch against a near peer enemy in 2030 is 
maintained. The analysis supports that the single most significant factor the JF is facing is 
the mismatch between human cognitive response time and the speed at which future enemy 
hyper velocity projectiles (HVPs) may travel. The data indicates that human decision 
makers introduce significant delays into the command and control system that could hinder 
the ability of the JF to promptly react and defend their platforms in future conflicts. The 
JFs of 2030 should consider pursuing artificial intelligence and machine learning 
algorithms to greatly reduce the C2 cycle times and data exchange delays of the JCEC C2, 
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A. BACKGROUND  
On 13 September 2016, an F-35 and an Aegis combat system demonstrated a 
cooperative engagement capability (CEC) where the Aegis platform successfully engaged 
and destroyed an incoming enemy missile that was beyond its detection range through the 
high-fidelity tracking data provided by the sensors on the F-35 (Lockheed Martin 
Newsroom 2019). This required a highly integrated command and control (C2) system 
between the F-35 and the Aegis combat system that included sensors, data processors, and 
high-data rate radio transmissions to find, target, and coordinate engagement of the missile 
prior to entering the friendly Aegis platform’s sensor range. This was a pivotal, yet 
incremental step in the futuristic Navy concept of Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter 
Air (NIFC-CA) where the fleet’s mission effectiveness in a contested environment relies 
on the extended range of airborne and surface-based sensors and a very rapid find-target-
engage cycle among its distributed components to interdict incoming missile threats. While 
a single enemy missile does not usually present an unmanageable threat with the Aegis 
combat system in defense of the platform, the future threat environment predicts a speed 
and volume of missile fire that would overwhelm the Aegis combat system if it was left to 
operate alone. In distributed maritime operations (DMO), the naval force may be 
configured into custom task organizations known as adaptive force packages (AFPs) where 
there may only be a single Aegis combat system close enough to affect the outcome of such 
engagements.  
While the F-35 acted as a sensor, the pilot acted as a decision maker, and the Aegis 
combat system acted as a shooter in the find-target-engage cycle, this is a very novel 
combination of platforms that require a large number of very specific situational 
circumstances to align in order to be effective. In this research project, the team explores 
ways to expand the number of platforms capable of participating in the cooperative 
engagement capability desirable in both NIFC-CA (air and missile defense) and surface 
and strike warfare through inclusion of joint platforms like the Patriot missile battery, 
AN/TPS-80 GATOR radar alongside naval platforms such as the guided missile destroyer, 
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littoral combat ship (LCS), F-35, large unmanned surface vessel (LUSV), and medium 
unmanned surface vessel (MUSV).  
B. DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS  
As adversary, sea denial tactics increasingly threaten the Navy fleet with cruise and 
ballistic missiles, so too are Navy fleet tactics evolving to address them. In order to conduct 
freedom of navigation operations and exert sea control over important maritime regions 
while allowing the highest value platforms to maintain appropriate standoff distances from 
adversary threats, it may be appropriate to distribute the naval force into task elements 
smaller than a traditional carrier strike group (CSG) or expeditionary strike group (ESG) 
while still being able to conduct surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, air & missile 
defense, and strike warfare. These are components of the composite warfare commander 
(CWC) concept (Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) 2015a). The task 
elements organized from their parent CSGs, ESGs, or other maritime groups or squadrons 
will be formed into mission-tailored threat-informed AFPs to enter the adversary’s weapon 
engagement zone (WEZ) and conduct sea control operations (NWDC 2015b). Because of 
the potential absence of high-value platforms such as nuclear-powered aircraft carriers or 
amphibious helicopter ships, the AFP must be able to conduct many of the same warfare 
functions that previously were centered on a capital ship while operating without the 
traditional cover associated with a CSG or ESG. Being able to divide the friendly naval 
force into AFPs allows it to conduct DMO. 
DMO is smaller-sized AFPs with commensurately scaled-down air and missile 
defense, surface and strike warfare capabilities tailored to be a subset of a larger force. The 
F-35 and Aegis combat system CEC previously discussed is a prime example of how reach 
and firepower can be scaled down and distributed. Distributed platforms are more difficult 
for the enemy to find, classify, target, and hit than their high-value counterparts. This is a 
far less favorable cost equation for the enemy. 
However, distributing the lethality among many smaller platforms and accepting a 
higher risk for their expendability does not guarantee robust CEC. The desired 
effectiveness of DMO can only be realized with a sufficiently robust C2 system. 
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C. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
The timeframe is 2030, and the friendly Blue Force (BF) has unmanned, 
autonomous surface ships to deploy that will lower the risk to manned platforms. The Red 
force (RF) threat is projecting power to control a highly coveted, narrow strait through 
which global trade flows to Red and Blue partner nations. Whoever controls the strait will 
most likely win the conflict because they will choke the opponent’s supply line. Both Red 
and Blue Forces have partner nations in the area and are building coalition forces to protect 
their assets along the strait.  
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The current Navy C2 capabilities must be capable of supporting an advanced CEC 
like that demonstrated between the F-35 and the Aegis. Distributed lethality platforms 
depend upon robust and timely C2 to exercise an effective CEC. There is an urgent need to 
develop a systems architecture that standardizes and speeds C2 interoperability to improve 
the overall joint force effectiveness in air and missile defense, naval surface, and air strike 
warfare by bringing platforms together in a joint CEC (JCEC). The focal point of this 
research is to understand the increased effectiveness of the kill chain by implementing 
shorter C2 cycles between 1) the observer conducting intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR); 2) the shooter; and 3) a more empowered, forward weapons release 
authority also known as the decision maker (DM). This will depend upon improved CEC 
interoperability and implementation of a CEC mesh network. 
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E. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
The Joint Fires (JFs) team follows a tailored system engineering process as shown 
in Figure 1 (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). The process begins by analyzing the 
stakeholder’s objectives to ensure correct interpretation of the problem. The next step 
translates the user’s required capabilities into requirements via the use of operational 
scenario. The requirements decompose into major functions which in turn drive the 
development and selection of Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of 
Performance (MOPs). The simulation and back of the envelope calculations support the 
MOEs and MOPs. 
 
Figure 1 A Tailored System Engineering Process. 
Source: Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011, 36). 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
In general terms, the JFs team was asked the following question: “What can be done 
to improve the operational effectiveness for manned and unmanned joint fires capabilities 
in the maritime operational environment?” This question can be decomposed into many 
parts that require an understanding of operations in the maritime operational environment 
and DMO, manned and unmanned naval and joint fires, and what constitutes high and low 
operational effectiveness. Decomposing these topics even further reveals the sub-topics of 
operational and tactical doctrine, specific manned and unmanned joint platforms and their 
respective capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), enemy doctrine and 
capabilities, and the command and control theory and architecture that make all friendly 
action possible and effective. A review of previous literature reveals both general 
background and context on these topics as well as related research.  
B. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
1. Operational and Tactical Doctrine 
To develop an understanding of distributed maritime operations, operations in the 
maritime operational environment, and naval and joint fires, and to establish a basic 
vocabulary on the topic, the JF team reviewed a wide range of doctrinal publications. The 
most valuable references were those related to organization and employment of naval 
forces in the maritime environment and related to naval and joint fires. This list of key 
doctrinal references includes NWCD Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3–56: Composite 
Warfare: Maritime Operations at the Tactical Level of War (NWDC 2015a); Navy Warfare 
Publication 3–10: Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Forces (NWDC 2015b); Joint 
Publication 3-09: Joint Fire Support (Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 2019); Navy Warfare 
Publication 3–09: Navy Fire Support (NWDC 2011); Joint Publication 3-60: Joint 
Targeting (JCS 2013); and Naval Tactics Techniques and Procedures (NTTP) 3–32.1: 
Maritime Operations Center (DON 2013a). Other doctrinal publications were referenced 
but excluded from this list because they did not provide substantive information upon 
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which to base theories that address what can be done to improve the operational 
effectiveness of joint fires capabilities in the maritime operational environment or aid in 
proving or disproving them. Through this research on operational and tactical doctrine, the 
team assembled the following shared vocabulary of key terms: 
Adaptive Force Package: “A non-standard unit, task organized to meet a specific 
operational requirement, as opposed to standard force packages that are comprised of task 
organized naval units that routinely train together and deploy in support of combatant 
commander (CCDR) operations such as a CSG” (NWDC 2015b). 
Distributed Maritime Operations: “The integration of a diversity of 
communications, sensors, and weapons platforms within an area of operations grid to form 
a real-time configurable Adaptive Force Package to counter the enemy” (DON 2019). For 
our research we have added that, “in a DMO environment, AFPs are geographically 
dispersed while still operating as a united, fighting, and lethal force” (Geiss 2019). 
Joint Fires: “Joint fire support is joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, space, 
cyberspace, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, 
airspace, space, cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, and key waters and to influence 
populations” (JCS 2019). This research focuses on joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, 
and special operations force to move, maneuver, and control territory, airspace, and key 
waters. 
Other key terms include Officer in Tactical Command (OTC), Composite Warfare 
Commander (CWC), Air and Missile Defense (AMD), Surface Warfare, and Strike 
Warfare. 
The study of operational and tactical doctrine will help ensure the findings of this 
research will fit reasonably well within the existing naval and joint operational framework. 
Proposed adjustments to the way forces are task organized and commanders are delegated 
decision-making authority must be workable within that framework.  
2. Related Research 
The Literature Review also includes a previously developed body of research with 
findings that share at least one main component with the Joint Fires in DMO research. Key 
shared areas of this research included command and control of forces during DMO, 
7 
command and control of manned and unmanned systems, and networked manned and 
unmanned air and missile defense, surface, or strike warfare systems.  
a. Theoretical Basis
The most significant body of research that impacts Joint Fires does so by providing
an evidenced foundational theory of fast command and control in a complex and dynamic 
environment. This research is presented in the form of the 2019 doctoral dissertation 
entitled, “Summary of a Framework for Engineered Complex, Adaptive (CA) System of 
Systems (SoS)” (Johnson 2019). Of particular interest for Joint Fires in DMO, this research 
illustrated the value of engineering complex adaptive combat systems of systems capable 
of displaying emergent behavior to outpace the enemy decision cycle by networking 
friendly force platforms with embedded intelligent agents and decision makers in a way 
that makes rapid self-organization, distributed decision making, and cooperative 
engagement possible. In this Capstone Project, the Joint Fires in DMO team attempts to 
apply Johnson’s findings to answer the following two questions: 1) “What are the 
requirements for an engineered C2 system that can interconnect friendly force platforms 
and decision makers in a way that makes rapid self-organization, distributed decision 
making, and cooperative engagement possible?” and, 2) “Can the inclusion of joint manned 
and unmanned platforms in the scenario space further improve the results?”  
b. Integration of Manned and Unmanned in Support of C2
The next body of research that relates to the JF’s research topic is the 2019 thesis 
entitled, “Analysis of Unmanned Surface Vessel Employment in Distributed Maritime 
Operations” (Geiss 2019). This research shares the foundational concept that improved 
effectiveness can be facilitated by increased speed of command and control and 
employment of distributed manned and unmanned platforms. The assertion that improved 
effectiveness can be facilitated by increased speed of command and control is supported 
by discrete events modeling employed in Johnson’s dissertation. The Geiss research topic 
also focuses on the application of fast command and control enabling distributed 
cooperative engagement between manned and unmanned surface platforms conducting the 
air and missile defense mission. It answers the question, “What is the optimal mix 
(considering capability and cost) of manned and unmanned surface vessels which share a 
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cooperative engagement capability to improve the operational effectiveness of the adaptive 
force package in distributed maritime operations?” The Geiss research also provides key 
friendly and enemy order of battle and capability information. The primary point departure 
of the JF’s research topic from the Geiss research topic is the question of joint platform 
inclusion and effectiveness in surface or strike warfare that constitutes the focus of this 
research. 
The next reference that addresses the JF’s research topic is the 2018 capstone report 
entitled, “Distributed Maritime Operations and Unmanned Systems Tactical Employment” 
(Popa et al. 2018). This research shares the underlying concept of employing fast command 
and control to improve operational effectiveness of the friendly force in distributed 
maritime operations as presented by Johnson. This paper explores the use of novel 
organizations, tactics, and C2 architecture of manned and unmanned systems to improve 
the speed and effectiveness of command and control in DMO. Popa further focuses on the 
improved mission effectiveness of the friendly naval force when employing larger numbers 
of distributed manned and unmanned air and missile defense platforms in conjunction with 
counter targeting tactics. While this paper uses modeling support to assess improved 
operational effectiveness of manned and unmanned fires capabilities in the maritime 
environment, it does not factor in joint platforms or provide significant evidence supporting 
improved effectiveness in surface or strike warfare which constitute this capstone’s joint 
fires objectives. 
The final research paper that relates to the JF’s capstone topic is the 2017 
“Command and Control for Distributed Lethality” (Corbett et al. 2017). This addresses the 
exchange of command and control information between weapon system platforms and 
decision makers conducting manned and unmanned cooperative engagement. This 
contributes to the concepts being explored by the JF’s capstone. 
c. DMO Network Architecture Options 
The next research paper relevant to the JF’s research project is the 2019 capstone 
report entitled, “Systems Engineering Approach to Determining the Suitability of Wireless 
Mesh Networks for Joint-Fires in Distributed Maritime Operations” (Bach, Brier, and 
McNeil 2019). Command and control network architectures are reflections of the way 
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decision makers exert command and control over subordinate commands or systems. For 
rigidly hierarchical command and control architectures, subordinate commands or systems 
are dependent on the presence of a higher echelon to coordinate their interactions. When 
all coordination must be facilitated by a single, central hub or top-level decision maker, to 
facilitate the exchange of information, it is known as a star or hub-spoke network 
architecture. Loss of that central node (hub) would mean that no two subordinate elements 
would be able to connect.  
A decentralized command and control hierarchy allows decision making to be 
delegated from the top decision maker down one of more levels. This is a standard approach 
to military command and control. Major units are organized into subordinate units that 
routinely train and operate together. An example of this is when the officer in tactical 
command delegates the surface warfare function to a surface warfare commander 
responsible to coordinate the activities of subordinate task elements related to surface 
warfare. A corresponding network architecture allows for all subordinates of that surface 
warfare commander to interconnect directly with the surface warfare commander.  
However, in general, if a surface warfare subordinate needed to coordinate with an 
air and missile defense platform, the coordination between them would be made at a higher 
level of command (i.e., composite warfare commander). This is representative of a 
decentralized network architecture where networked nodes must connect with a higher 
echelon to exchange information laterally. 
Finally, a distributed command and control architecture is where the authority to 
make decisions is delegated to the lowest level possible. Adjacent units can form into teams 
as necessary to create the desired effects and self-organize the decision cycle as necessary 
to respond to emerging problems. Distributed command and control architectures, 
conducive to rapidly forming and operating are not optimal with centralized or 
decentralized network architectures. A network architecture that reflects the distributed 
command and control architecture must be able to connect all nodes with minimal time lost 
to reconfiguration. Therefore, a non-hierarchical mesh, or ad-hoc network architecture is 
ideal. These three networks architcture options are depicted in Figure 2. 
 




Figure 2. Network Architectures: Centralized, Decentralized, and 
Distributed. Source: Bach, Brier, and McNeil (2019). 
 
The report, “Systems Engineering Approach to Determining the Suitability of 
Wireless Mesh Networks for Joint-Fires in Distributed Maritime Operations,” (Bach, Brier, 
and McNeil 2019) provides evidence to support the claim that wireless mesh 
communications architectures are more effective than star or hierarchical networks for 
connecting weapons systems and decision makers in the distributed maritime operational 
environment. This topic is explored further in the JF’s capstone. 
3. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) 
The other key source of information on operational effectiveness when 
implementing CEC is provided by recent technology experiments and the work of 
capability integrators. It is evident that in September 2016, according to the U.S. Naval 
Institute, a break-through cooperative engagement technology was demonstrated between 
the F-35B and the Aegis combat system that accomplished many of the goals of the 
aforementioned doctrinal publications and lends weight to the assertions and findings of 
past researchers (Lockheed Martin Newsroom 2016). The report of this accomplishment 
provides sufficient confidence that this technology is mature enough to build upon within 
the scope of the JF’s capstone research.  
In December 2017, the Army Fires Bulletin published an article describing the 
significant potential to be gained by integrating the F-35’s sensors directly with the M142 
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HIMARS weapon system so that the sensing functions in one could inform the targeting 
and firing of the other without the aid of a coordinating agent (Russo 2017). This is one of 
many use cases central to the JF’s capstone project. Finally, to provide context to the 
desired operational effectiveness of the JF’s research proposal, it is noted that in November 
2019, U.S. military service chiefs came together to agree on a strategy of incorporating the 
joint manned and unmanned CEC (Hitchens 2019). 
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III. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
A. GENERAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
A friendly, joint Blue Force (BF) is tasked with maintaining freedom of navigation 
and sea control against a near peer, adversarial Red Force (RF) in the south Pacific region. 
The area of operations includes friendly and neutral nations that desire safe passage of air 
and maritime shipping to ensure continued conditions favorable to trade and economic 
growth. The battlespace consists of open ocean, sea lanes, and land masses that range in 
size from small shoals to that of continents.  
During routine operations, the friendly, joint BF operates in the contact layer, where 
naval forces transit sea lanes and aid in enforcement of elements of international law related 
to protection of allied regional interests. Amphibious, land, air, and special forces conduct 
theater security cooperation exercises to develop stronger ties with allied militaries and 
provide nation building aid where possible (DOD 2018).  
During periods of escalated tensions, the BFs must rapidly reorganize and refocus 
to deter or prevent conflict escalation at the blunt layer. This means that some military 
action, usually lethal, is required at a level below full-scale war. Naval, amphibious, land, 
air, and special forces assigned to the theater task organize into a joint task force adapted 
to create the desired military effects (Colby 2019). 
As the need may arise for the friendly joint BF to commit to full scale war against 
a major regional maritime power, the force must have the flexibility to reorganize and 
surge, as necessary. This means that the friendly nation and allies mobilize reserve forces 
and bring them to bear against their regional adversary.  
During this scenario, the friendly BF begins operation at the contact layer and must 
escalate its posture to support blunt layer and surge layer operations. A friendly, joint BF 
consists of a carrier strike group and an amphibious ready group conducting freedom 
navigation and theater security cooperation or contact layer operations (Colby 2019). When 
transiting sea lanes, the maritime force observes a peer competitor force conducting 
maritime operations meant to deter friendly, BF from transiting by the most economical 
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route through international waters. The near peer, adversarial RF is asserting new claims 
of ownership over the waterways including natural resources. 
 
Figure 3. Region of Interest within the Scenario Space. 
 
The RF territory is situated in a manner that allows it to reach 1,500 miles or greater 
with its anti-ship missile capability placing key waterways under direct threat of attack. 
The operational scenario takes place in a focal point of a region. A major chokepoint for 
regional shipping is indicated with the brown dotted line box as shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 4 depicts a scenario space with its designated shipping lanes. This possible 
DMO scenario begins when multi-source intelligence assets observe the adversary RF, 
employing medium range surface to surface missiles, striking, and sinking a commercial 
vessel from a partner nation in international waters.  
 




Figure 4. Scenario Space’s Major Shipping Lanes 
 
The joint, BF commander directs the maritime force to neutralize the RF platforms 
that sank the partner nation’s vessel and threaten free navigation of key waterways. The 
RF platform’s possible locations are displayed in Figure 5. The friendly BFs conducting 
contact layer operations are distributed throughout the region. Based on their understanding 
of the enemy strength, disposition, and capabilities, the combatant commander and navy 
component commander task-organize a small adaptive force package (AFP) from the 
available naval, amphibious, land, air, and special operations resources appropriate to 
prosecute the RF platforms. The adaptive force package is placed under a single joint task 
force (JTF) commander and will begin conducting blunt layer operations. 
 




Figure 5. Red Force Military Base Locations 
 
This adaptive force package is relatively small consisting of three to five manned 
and unmanned surface and subsurface vessels, four to eight manned and unmanned aircraft, 
and ground combat units capable of conducting air and missile defense and medium range 
rocket attack. The supported JTF commander will also serve as the joint maritime 
component commander, and officer in tactical command (OTC), as outlined in the CWC 
concept (NWDC 2015a). However, because of the unknown extent of the enemy’s 
response, the Navy’s component commander will mitigate risk by maneuvering the naval 
force to be able to influence the AFP’s operating area with reinforcing fires. 
The objective is to find and neutralize the naval platforms from which the adversary 
missiles were launched. However, to do so, the AFP will have to enter the adversary 
weapons engagement zone populated by hidden surface to surface missile platforms, safe 
harbors for gunboats, and airfields for strike aircraft. The AFP may need to mitigate a wide 
spectrum of threats while in pursuit of the objective.  
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This scenario is divided into two phases. First the AFP will transit to the objective 
area across open ocean, inside of the adversary’s integrated air and surface defensive 
weapons engagement zone, in which friendly use of fires is characterized as defensive in 
nature. During this phase, fires must neutralize threats from adversary strike aircraft, anti-
ship, cruise missiles, or hyper velocity projectiles in flight, and any submarines or gunboats 
with which the enemy may attempt to gain an asymmetric advantage. Threats identified 
during this phase can be mitigated through radar and integrated surface and air defense, 
patrolling manned and unmanned aircraft, surface, or subsurface vessels, and theater aerial 
or space-based surveillance. This scenario concept of operations is depicted in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. BF versus RF, First Phase Concept of Operations  
 
As the friendly BF transits the open ocean to close with the area of operations (AO), 
the joint force commander should seek to bring joint force capabilities to the defense of the 
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AFP. In doing so, the joint special operations force or maritime component commander 
provides covert units to seize advanced expeditionary airfields in the vicinity of the enemy 
force, and the joint force air component commander provides rapidly deployable strategic 
airlift capabilities to covertly transport and deploy land air search and air and missile 
defense (AMD) passive sensors or active radars as the situation and threat demands. Also, 
in this outer sensor ring, medium displacement unmanned surface vessels, unmanned aerial 
systems, and F-35s are interconnected with the ground sensors to exchange target-quality 
data. However, they will exercise coordinated emissions control (EMCON) until the 
decisive point is cued by theater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). In a 
defensive ring closer to the AFP, the C-17s covertly land Air Defense Artillery platforms 
(i.e., Patriot Batteries) that can be linked to, and coordinated with, other integrated counter-
air fire control systems and firing platforms to include other medium displacement 
unmanned surface vessels, unmanned aerial systems, and manned platforms. 
The second phase will be characterized by the integration of offensive fires. As the 
AFP closes with the adversary RF, the RF will reveal its full defensive capabilities. For the 
AFP to survive, the transit to the objective area must identify, target, and employ fires to 
neutralize the threats. RF threats can be identified by electromagnetic or electro optical 
observation of inbound missiles, high velocity projectiles, or missile batteries or by 
electromagnetic detection of enemy targeting radars. RF threats can then be cooperatively 
engaged and neutralized by fires from a wide range of joint distributed lethality platforms 
available to the AFP. These AFPs include, but are not limited to, manned and unmanned 
strike aircraft, manned and unmanned surface and subsurface missile platforms, artillery, 
or missile-capable land forces. They can be maneuvered to adjacent landmasses by air or 
surface connectors and can target with long-range land-based conventional ballistic 
missiles. Finally, joint fires will be used for accomplishment of the objective to neutralize 
the enemy, RF targets. In Figure 7, the integration of offensive fires concept of operations 
is depicted. 
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Figure 7. BF Offensive Fires Concept of Operations  
 
It is important to note that both phases of the scenario bear some risk to non-
combatant vessels, though significantly more when operating in the littoral environment or 
among sea lanes. Increased use of semi-autonomous or fully autonomous portions of the 
kill chain must not infringe on the necessary weapons release authority delegated to the 
AFP’s OTC.  
B. SPEEDING UP THE DECISION CYCLE 
The following quote from the Marine Corps doctrine emphasizes the criticality of 
speed in warfare. 
Speed is a weapon. In war, it is relative speed that matters rather than 
absolute speed. Superior speed allows us to seize the initiative and dictate 
the terms of action, forcing the enemy to react to us. Speed provides 
security. It is a prerequisite for maneuver and for surprise. Moreover, speed 
is necessary to concentrate superior strength at the decisive time and place. 
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(Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1997) To generate the tempo 
of operations we desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and 
fluidity of combat, command and control must be decentralized. We must 
not try to maintain excessive control over subordinates since this will 
necessarily slow our tempo and inhibit initiative. (MCDP 1997) 
Within the scope of AFP operations, there are two primary command and control 
problems to solve. The first is the enemy missile barrage problem which poses a threat that 
centralized command and control struggles with, at least in a hierarchical model reliant on 
the cooperation of multiple echelons of command and control agencies. The second 
problem is conducting surface and strike warfare quickly enough to preemptively 
neutralize enemy weapon platforms or to stop them from posing a continued threat. 
However, the ranges of the various platforms in the AFP are finite and do not, individually, 
cover the entire scenario battlespace. To dominate in the battlespace, the AFP must make 
use of coordinated fires, where systems and platforms come together to perform the 
functions of the targeting cycle. This consists of finding, targeting, and engaging the 
enemy. AFP assets must also iterate through this coordinated targeting cycle faster than the 
adversary can react. There are two basic paradigms for coordinated fires: internally 
integrated and externally integrated.  
Internally integrated fires systems would include the Aegis combat system or the 
Patriot anti-air missile battery. An internally integrated fires system is very fast because all 
sensors and weapons systems wait in a high state of readiness for the threat to appear, and 
when the threat appears within the engagement zone and engagement criteria (set by the 
rules of engagement and the commander’s intent) are met, then only a single human is 
required to authorize the release of lethal munitions. That human may be aided by other 
humans or decision support systems, but if the authority has been granted, and the decision 
maker is trained on correct employment, then no higher or adjacent coordination needs to 
be sought.  
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Figure 8. Example of Internally Integrated Combat Systems 
With an internally integrated combat system like the Aegis combat system, as 
depicted in Figure 8 (top), where the AN/SPY-1 radar is operating, the weapons are armed 
and ready, and a means of positive identification is active, the time from detection to launch 
should be less than one minute. The Patriot missile battery, as depicted in Figure 8 
(bottom), is a combat system with similar internal integration. 
Conversely, especially within the joint environment, external organizations rarely 
form at the tactical level. Usually, a Joint Force Commander is appointed and acts as the 
coordinating authority for joint fires (JCS 2019). This generally means that for a Navy 
platform to provide fires against a target identified by an Army platform, detailed target 
coordination, including weapons release authority, would be requested up or tasked down 
several echelons in a chain of command all the way up to the Joint Force Commander’s 
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fires cell, see Figure 9. In a joint force, it may take as long as 20 minutes for the force to 
engage an unexpected target of opportunity because of centralized control exerted over 
joint fires which are externally integrated. 
 
 
Figure 9. Joint Force Commander’s Fire Cell, Externally Integrated 
 
In September 2016, an F-35 demonstrated its CEC by passing missile tracking data 
to the Aegis combat system that then successfully engaged the incoming missile while it 
was outside the Aegis system’s radar range (Lockheed Martin Newsroom 2016). The 
missile was destroyed just as it entered the Aegis system’s radar range (Lockheed Martin 
Newsroom 2016). The primary example of CEC by means of a C2 system that 
interconnected the F-35 in an observer role and the Aegis combat system in a shooter role, 
as depicted in Figure 10, increased the effective range of the Aegis combat system and thus 
eliminated several minutes which the missile would have spent closing the distance toward 
the friendly force.  




Figure 10. Example of CEC Using F-35 and Aegis 
 
In order for joint CEC to emulate the speed of an internally integrated combat 
system (like the Aegis or Patriot missile battery), participating joint platforms must be 
directly connected, and command and control authority must also be delegated to the 
lowest level possible. If the observer platform (e.g., Army Grey Eagle) is interconnected 
with all of the potential shooter platforms in the area (e.g., Littoral Combat Ship), and 
weapons release authority is delegated to the shooter platform, the amount of time it takes 
to complete the targeting cycle may be reduced as shown in Figure 11. Externally 
integrated joint platforms may emulate internally integrated C2 systems to reduce target 
cycle time through CEC.  
 




Figure 11. Externally Integrated Joint Platforms Emulating Internally 
Integrated C2 via CEC 
 
C. LETHAL TRIAD: ROLES THAT COMPRISE JOINT CEC 
In order to establish common terminology that is agnostic to specific platforms, and 
in consideration of the preference to distribute command and control down to the lowest 
level, the JFs team has decomposed the CEC into a bare minimum organization. Three 
roles are needed: a platform capable of observing joint fires; a platform capable of firing 
munitions; and a platform with weapons release authority. These three roles will be 
hereafter referred to as the ISR/Observer role, the Shooter role, and the Decision Maker 
(DM) role.  
The ISR/Observer role takes the name of ISR to denote that the platform’s primary 
role in this case is intelligence, surveillance, and/or reconnaissance. This applies to many 
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manned and unmanned aviation or surface platforms. However, since many platforms that 
can perform ISR have additional capabilities such as air search, surface search, airspace 
control, or fires support the name Observer may be used interchangeably with ISR. It is 
also possible that an ISR/Observer platform needs to be directed to a location by cueing 
from another ISR asset. For example, a search radar identifies a contact, but the fidelity of 
the search radar’s data is not high enough to target the contact. The data from the search 
radar cues the platform with a better radar to collect targeting-quality data. Other sources 
of cueing might be ground-based or satellite-based. It is important to note that the 
ISR/Observer platform does not need to be manned. On the other hand, unless the decision 
is made to pursue artificial intelligence and/or fully automated weapons release by the 
Shooter, targeting data must make its way to a platform capable of positive identification, 
which can only be performed by a human decision maker.  
The Shooter role refers to a platform that has the capability to fire munitions to 
engage a target. Not all shooters can engage all targets and many platforms discussed in 
this research can perform the roles of both Shooter and ISR/Observer. Examples include 
the F-35 cited earlier. In a few cases, the shooter does not have its own internal 
‘ISR/Observer’ capability. The M142 HIMARS is an example of a shooter platform that 
relies on calls for fire from forward observers to provide fire control information. It is 
important to note that a Shooter platform may require human interaction to bring the system 
into a state of readiness according to the tasking and the threat. However, for the fastest 
joint cooperative capability, the platform should be able to fire immediately upon remote 
triggering by the decision maker WITHOUT another human in the loop.  
The decision maker role refers to the only necessary human in the loop. With an 
ISR/Observer platform providing targeting-quality data and a Shooter platform that has 
been placed into a state of readiness for remote triggering, the DM is responsible for C2, 
including launch authority. The DM must consider the rules of engagement and 
commander’s intent, whether the target has been positively identified as a threat, and 
whether an appropriate Shooter can adequately and proportionally engage the target. If 
these criteria are met, the DM authorizes weapons release and remotely triggers firing of 
munitions to engage the target. In delegating decision authority to the lowest level, the DM 
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must ideally be the lowest echelon in the tactical chain of command that can receive and 
process sufficient information to authorize weapons release. The DM must therefore have 
access to a decision support system that processes, correlates, and simplifies the many 
aspects of the threat and defensive capabilities available.  
This capstone argues that the more an AFP is networked and equipped to connect 
its various ISR/Observer, Shooter, and DM platforms into a joint CEC (JCEC) (as it does 
with the F-35 and the Aegis combat system), the better it will be able to rapidly execute 
the find-target-engage kill chain cycle in response to dynamic missile threats or targets of 
opportunity. The future fight is joint in nature and will benefit greatly from the inclusion 
of manned and unmanned joint platforms engineered as complex adaptive systems of 
systems. This will require the integration of a common JCEC into a much wider range of 
joint platforms (Johnson 2019). This capstone research explores the benefit of 
interconnecting the sea-based, land-based, or aviation-based, manned, or unmanned 
platforms in the joint inventory in the battlespace to make this JCEC possible. According 
to the principles of complex adaptive systems of systems (CASoS), the force would then 
be able to self-organize in response to changes in the threat environment to display 
emergent behavior of the sensor, shooter, and DM, also referred to as the lethal triad, in the 
rapid and decentralized prosecution of enemy targets. 
A lethal triad consists of one or more sea surface-, ground surface-, or aviation-
based, manned, or unmanned platforms in the joint inventory which, together, are able to 
perform all three of the ISR/Observer, Shooter, and DM roles. Figure 12 depicts potential 
ISR/Observer platforms on the right, Shooters on the left, and DMs at the top.




Figure 12. Lethal Triad Potential Platforms  
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D. PRIMARY FUNCTIONS THAT COMPRISE A JCEC 
With the understanding of what constitutes a cooperative engagement capability, 
we can decompose the capability into its constituent functions and organize them into four 
basic functional elements. First, like any joint fire’s capability, a complete CEC has an 
observer capable of identifying the precise location of a potential target. In the missile 
threat environment, the precision of location detail must be extremely high and updated 
many times per second. Platforms capable of this high-fidelity target-quality data include 
the Aegis combat system (specifically the SPY-1 radar), the F-35, the AN/TPS-80 GATOR 
radar, the Patriot battery radar, and many others.  
Second, a complete CEC has the capability to share this high-fidelity target-quality 
data from the Observer/ISR platform with other participating platforms. Within the Aegis 
combat system, the SPY-1 radar communicates this data internally via its tightly integrated 
internal fire control network. Between the F-35 and the Aegis platform, this exchange of 
targeting data occurs over a tightly integrated, jam-resistant, high-data rate, radio network 
like the multifunction advanced data link (MADL). Also, the ability to seamlessly enter 
into a CEC network with any platform from the joint force is desirable. It is feasible that a 
ubiquitous, open standard means of secure communication of targeting and fire control 
data can be replicated and integrated into new combinations (USNI NEWS 2016).  
Third, a complete CEC has a firing platform with a munition capable of 
successfully prosecuting the observed target. In the missile threat environment, this 
munition can be any of the joint inventory of guided anti-air missiles such as SM-2, SM-3, 
SM-6, PAC-3, and AIM-9 Sidewinder. The firing platforms must be able to receive a 
stream of high-fidelity, target-quality data which updates many times per second. Once 
launched, the anti-air missile must rely on this stream of target-quality data until it is close 
enough to the target for internal guidance systems to acquire the target and perform 
terminal control. Also, to intercept incoming enemy missiles, a platform launching guided 
anti-air missiles must respond very quickly to launch commands. Human actuation of firing 
mechanisms must be minimal or non-existent after the decision to launch has been made, 
else critical moments in the CEC response time will be wasted. It is for this purpose that 
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any CEC firing platform is recommended to have a slave mode of operation. Once the 
human operator has configured the firing platform for the air and missile defense mission, 
a distant decision maker with training and authority can trigger the munition’s launch 
remotely. In strike or surface warfare, this munition can be any of the joint inventory of 
surface to surface missiles. While less critical for surface or strike warfare, the high speed 
of the surface to surface missile response is also necessary for the successful engagement 
of fleeting targets of opportunity. Therefore, a slave mode of operation could be employed 
for surface-to-surface engagements as well. These munitions-firing functions will be 
categorized as the shooter functional element.  
Fourth, a complete CEC has a decision support/decision making capability where 
the human decision maker interfaces with the system and authorizes weapons release. The 
weapons release decision is informed by a combination of commander’s intent related to 
fires objectives and rules of engagement, a fires-related decision support system identifying 
the available and optimal munitions for each target, and other sources of shared situational 
awareness. This weapons release decision is communicated in the form of an execution 
command that activates the slave-mode munition capable of prosecuting the observed 
target. This decision support and promulgation function will be categorized as the C2 
functional element. The CEC exchange of data as described above is shown in Figure 13. 




Figure 13. CEC Exchanges among the ISR, Decision Maker, and Shooter 
 
E. MESSAGING PROTOCOLS 
Digital fires-related C2 information is exchanged between systems based on the 
United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standardized messaging 
protocols defined by MIL-STD-6016 and STANAG 5516 (Hura et al. 2000). Messages 
related to precise participant location and identification (PPLI) of friendly and surveilled 
enemy platforms, weapons coordination, platform system and status, tasking, control, and 
network management are all defined according to the standardized Tactical Digital 
Information Link (TADIL) J-series message format (DOA 2000). Several communications 
systems have been developed over many years to support transmission of these digital J-
series messages, or the near-real-time exchange of J-series messages among tactical data 
systems. Each such system is specified by hardware/software characteristics as well as by 
message and protocol standards (Hura et al. 2000). 
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A complete CEC will continue to make use of standardized J-series messages to 
remain interoperable with the joint force at the digital level regardless of which radio 
waveform, modulation schemes, rates, or transmission media are used. There are many 
systems currently fielded which interoperate at the digital level because they use J-series 
messages. This includes Joint Range Extension Application Protocol (JREAP) which can 
travel over radio signals, telephone lines, and internet connections (DON 2013b) as well 
as Link-16.  
“Link-16 is an encrypted, jam-resistant, tactical digital data link network 
established by communication terminals that transmit and receive standardized J-series 
data messages” (Hura et al. 2000). In the United States, Link-16 generally refers to the J-
series message processor and the L-band, UHF radio that transmits and receives them. In 
general, NATO recognizes Link-16 as the capability to process J-series messages while 
each particular type of Link-16-capable radio system is defined by its characteristics of 
frequency, size, weight, power, hopping algorithm, compatible platform etc. It is useful in 
this research to separate these two aspects of digital message exchange. Hereafter, the 
important aspect of Link-16 which will be carried forward into the proposed system of 
interest will be the J-series messaging protocol and capability of processing or translating 
it. However, this research will challenge a few aspects of the common approach to the radio 
transmissions of Link-16 including frequency and directionality. The strengths, 
weaknesses, and conclusions about JCEC radio capabilities will be elaborated in the next 
section.  
F. REQUIRED COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES
a. Transmission Rate and Responsiveness
Entering and exiting a Joint CEC network must be seamless to allow the rapid 
formation of a complete CEC assembled from whichever distributed lethality platforms are 
present in the time and location of the enemy attack. To be fast enough to start engaging 
an enemy missile barrage early enough to survive, the first platform to observe the enemy 
missiles must be able to immediately feed the closest firing platform’s fire control system 
with targeting data. This is delayed if the participating platforms first need to enter a 
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different radio network than each is currently monitoring. If a verbal command and the re-
configuration of radios is first required to enter the network, then additional response time 
is wasted. If the ideal observer and shooter platforms do not even share compatible radio 
protocols between them, then a third-party platform with radio cross-banding or protocol 
translation would be required before cooperatively engaging the target. Those more 
centralized (versus distributed) communications architectures may be inadequate for C2 
situations that require a high degree of responsiveness (Corbett et al. 2017). At a minimum, 
a mesh network where any member can exchange data with any other member is preferred 
over a star/hub-spoke/centralized network topology (Bach, Brier, and McNeil 2019). 
The two-part Link-16 capability, including J-series message processing and anti-
jam radio transmission, is implemented on various joint platforms as variations and 
improvements upon the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS). The 
following is a direct quotation from Navy Tactics Techniques and Procedures.  
JTIDS (AN/URC-107 series systems) and Multifunctional Information 
Distribution System (MIDS) (AN/USQ-140 series systems) are high-
capacity, time division multiple access (TDMA) systems that provide 
integrated communications, navigation, and identification of friend or foe 
(IFF) capabilities. They provide electronic counter-counter measure 
(ECCM) capabilities such as spread spectrum and frequency hopping for 
aircraft and surface ships, extended range of communications, and over-the-
horizon communications for surface ships with an airborne relay platform. 
The maximum transmission rate with full anti-jam and error detection and 
correction is 59.5 kbps with an effective data throughput of 26.8 kbps. Data 
throughput of 107.5 kbps is attainable but with a sacrifice of some anti-jam 
and error detection and correction capability. Timeslots are preassigned for 
transmission, which eliminates the need for a net control station. Air and 
surface tracks are nominally updated once every 12 seconds. Land tracks 
are reported less frequently than air tracks (nominally at 48 seconds). Tracks 
are reported in latitude, longitude, and height coordinates, which allows for 
reporting of tracks anywhere on Earth. (DON 2005)  
In general, 12 seconds between transmissions is too slow to effectively update precise 
target locations many times per second as required in a joint CEC. 
The legacy MIDS Link-16 construct are improved upon with recent development 
of the MIDS Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) per the following quote.  
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When integrated into a host platform, MIDS JTRS provides Link 16 digital 
datalink, Link 16 digital voice communications, and Tactical Air 
Navigation (TACAN) capabilities, plus three additional programmable 
channels capable of hosting additional JTRS compliant waveforms in the 2 
Megahertz to 2 Gigahertz radio frequency band. In addition, MIDS JTRS 
provides the capability for Link 16 enhanced throughput and Link 16 
frequency re-mapping. (DOTE 2012) 
These aspects of Link-16 are better suited for the dynamic cooperative engagement 
capability and spectrum denied environment. Of specific interest to this research, “MIDS 
JTRS terminals have been developed to conduct Concurrent Multi-Net Reception using 
four-channel Concurrent Multi-netting with Concurrent Retention Receive. This provides 
improved digital receivers, improved buffering, and faster processors to allow host aircraft 
to receive more Link 16 messages during periods of high message exchange demand” 
(DOTE 2012). This makes it possible to essentially quadruple the number of terminals that 
can participate in the otherwise fixed-size network and can make it reasonable to assign 
individual sensor or shooter platform with multiple time slots, so that time between 
transmissions can be shorter intervals than 12 seconds (DOA 2019). However, it is unclear 
if this decrease in time between time slot allocations will lead to operational improvements 
to friendly naval forces when applying CEC. 
b. Resistance to Electromagnetic Interference  
Further, the cooperative engagement capability demonstrated by the F-35 and 
Aegis combat system was designed to resist a significant amount of electromagnetic 
interference. The proprietary multi-function advanced data link (MADL) fulfills the 
requirement for high data throughput and high resilience to electromagnetic interference 
(Lockheed Martin Newsroom 2019). While the MADL’s proprietary characteristics are not 
available for this research, principles of communications engineering reveal what a 
hypothetical high-data-rate, jam-resistant radio protocol might look like.  
Spot Jamming is jamming technique that causes overwhelming interference to a 
single frequency (DOA 2019a). “Frequency hopping is the repeated switching of 
frequencies during radio transmission” and minimizing unauthorized interception or 
jamming of single frequency radio transmissions (DON 2013b). “The overall bandwidth 
required for frequency hopping is much wider than that required to transmit the same 
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information using only one carrier frequency” (DON 2013b). This is also a form of what 
is known as “spread spectrum.” 
A minimally effective jam-resistant radio protocol is identified by its ability to hop 
between many frequencies far enough apart from each other that the enemy cannot use 
simple narrowband (spot) jamming techniques. This research assumes that narrowband 
(spot) jamming capabilities are available to any individual or nation-state actor that may 
be found in the battlespace. Further, the hopping algorithm should be unpredictable to the 
enemy to avoid allowing the enemy to establish a time-sync with the friendly radios thereby 
predicting the next frequency in the hopping algorithm, and jamming each frequency 
before it can be used to transport friendly information. Many amateur radio enthusiasts, 
and certainly industrialized nations can obtain the ability to observe a range of frequencies 
and use computer software to decipher the hopping algorithm and jam specific frequencies 
(Schweizer 2017). 
Many industrialized nations can likely also employ high-power broad-spectrum 
interference signals (known as barrage jamming) to jam all frequencies in an adversary’s 
hopping algorithm at the same time (DOA 2019a). While more difficult, it is reasonable to 
expect that peer nation states can produce high-power, barrage jamming signals against a 
moving target from a long range for a long enough period of time to interfere with the 
friendly find-target-engage fires cycle.  
Frequency hopping alone is not enough to mitigate the effects of enemy jamming. 
In order to best mitigate threats to enemy jamming, a joint CEC radio should also be 
directional (DOA 2019a). Many current MIDS/Link-16 systems employ omni-directional 
antennas and are therefore susceptible to jamming effects from any direction. Directional 
antennas close the window of opportunity for enemy jamming down to the minimum size 
possible according to the limits of physics (Johnson 1993). Minimum beam size in a 
dynamic mobile environment equates to minimal time of exposure as well. Communicating 
over directional antennas requires geometric alignment of the transmitter and receiver 
(Johnson 1993). Any misalignment will result in radiated electromagnetic energy failing 
to reach its intended destination. This cannot be overcome by extra power and better 
frequency tuning.  
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Directional antennas require the members of the network to be geospatially self-
aware and able to communicate their three-dimensional position information to all other 
members of the network to generate useful antenna orientation information. However, if 
the system of interest is designed with directional antenna coverage pointed to and from 
the front, rear, left, right, top, and bottom of a platform (aerial platform in this case), the 
platform gains the ability to direct its radio signals to any other available platform within 
signal range. Further, given equal input power, a directional antenna provides radio signals 
and data rates that are orders of magnitude higher than their omnidirectional counterparts 
(Johnson 1993). This means that, should the enemy attempt broad-spectrum jamming, the 
desired friendly signal would likely still be stronger than the jamming signal or have only 
a momentary impact because of the constant change in relative position between the 
friendly receiver and the enemy jammer. Phased array radio frequency transceivers are 
found on many military platforms and have many benefits over omnidirectional or 
mechanically steerable antennas (Ong 2004). While heavier and more complex than their 
parabolic counterparts, phased array transceivers can be designed to fit any candidate CEC 
platform including the F-35 (Ong 2004). 
When aggregating these various assured, high-data rate radio communications 
factors, unifying theory of jam-resistance emerges based on low probabilities. When 
frequency hopping and directional (phased array) antennas are combined to produce a 
highly jam-resistant radio capability, an increasingly rare set of circumstances would be 
required for the enemy to create an effective jamming signal. For instance, the jammer and 
the friendly receiver would need to be geometrically aligned due to the requirement for 
directionality. Further, the jamming platform would need to observe and record the full 
hopping algorithm, decipher it, and produce a stronger interference signal in time-sync with 
a friendly signal. It would also have to employ a higher degree of directionality than the 
friendly platform, which is likely closer to, and receiving pointing information from, the 
friendly radio at the distant end. The jamming platform may alternatively attempt to jam 
the entire range of frequencies in the hopping algorithm, which is again extraordinarily 
difficult against a moving target, even more so when the friendly radios are already in 
closer proximity to each other and are using location-informed, auto-tracking, high power 
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directional antennas. If the combination of the above conditions were to exist, they would 
likely only exist momentarily because of the constant change in relative position and 
attitude among the various moving friendly and enemy platforms. 
Finally, a sub-system could be designed that automatically nulls the receiving 
antenna when a desired radio signal does not carry an encrypted authentication code, 
indicating that it is a jamming signal. If one face of the phased array antenna is receiving a 
signal that is determined to be a jamming signal that face of the antenna could simply be 
turned off. The remaining antenna panels, assuming they are facing friendly forces in a 
distributed network architecture and have radio-relay abilities like the MIDS JTRS, will 
provide alternative radio pathways for the platform. In this way, any jamming signal that 
does not overcome all the above conditions, would be ineffective. 
As of this research, fielded MIDS terminals do transmit and receive on phased array 
or flat-panel directional antennas. As long as the four way concurrent multi-netting (CMN-
4) MIDS JTRS time slots are allocated in a way that increases message exchange between 
observer, ISR, and DM platforms to the high rate necessary to update dynamic CEC 
tracking information, the CMN-4 MIDS JTRS network may be sufficient. However, this 
research assumes that this is not yet the case. This research offers the alternative possibility 
that an ad hoc frequency hopping point-to-point network be established between every two 
platforms which are in range of each other that would overall constitute a full, force-wide, 
distributed mesh architecture.  
Also, truly seamless entry into the JCEC network requires that every potential 
participant can enter and interoperate without any user adjustment to configurations or 
verbal relay of messages. The CMN-4 MIDS JTRS still relies on pre-planned addressing 
of all nodes in the network each time the network is re-formed. This suggests that a JCEC 
network requires each participant platform in the joint force be issued a globally unique 
address and authentication code that allows for automatic entry into the network regardless 
of which component of the joint force or originating base, the platform came from. 
Based on recent developments where the F-35 and Aegis or F-35 and HIMARS 
were paired together to execute missions, this capstone proposes an engineered J-series 
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message processing system like a MIDS terminal to be integrated on the various joint 
forces platforms using a new MADL-like open-standard radio protocol which can be 
designed by 2030. This system would have high-data rate and jam-resistance capabilities 
while also hosting an addressing schema favorable to seamless entry by any joint 














   
 
38 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
39 
IV. PROPOSED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
A. SYSTEM OF INTEREST (SOI)
The system of interest (SOI), shown in Figure 14, centers on the mission of a
friendly, Blue Force (BF) controlling the enemy, Red Force’s (RF) influence of a strategic, 
bottleneck, trade route and the execution of the kill chain functions performed by the BF 
during the conflict that ensues. The kill chain function of finding the RF threat is conducted 
by the BF ISR, the function of targeting the RF threat is performed by the BF decision 
maker, and the function of engaging the RF threat is conducted by the BF shooter. There 
are multiple messages exchanged between the lethal triad during execution of the kill chain 
functions and a recognized need to shorten the C2 cycle, improve interoperability between 
the lethal triad platforms while performing CEC, and therefore increase the effectiveness 
of the kill chain to ensure overmatch of a near peer enemy by 2030 when naval unmanned 
surface vessels are predicted to join the fleet.  
Figure 14. System of Interest—JF Kill Chain’s Increased Effectiveness 
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Based on previous research by the SEA 27 capstone group in 2018, as captured in 
Figure 15, the kill chain functions were shortened from find, fix, track, target, engage, and 
assess (F2T2EA) to find, target, and engage (FTE) due to the modernization of weapon 
systems which now perform multiple functions simultaneously (Popa et al. 2018). The ISR 
platform performs the find role by collecting location information about the threat and 
maintaining track (Popa et.al. 2018). The decision maker performs the targeting role by 
determining the resources available, prioritizing the threats, developing the options, 
selecting the methods, and deciding to further engage by allocating the resources (Popa et 
al. 2018). The shooter performs the engage role by striking the threat (Popa et al. 2018).  
For the purposes of this research, however, the JF team has chosen to modify the 
SEA 27’s groupings to those shown in Figure 16 by moving the ordering of engagements 
and transmitting of orders to the decision maker’s targeting activities as indicated by the 
yellow highlights. Further, the assess function will be considered part of the ISR’s finding 
functions as indicated by the blue highlights. 
  





Figure 15. Shortening of the Kill Chain to Find, Target, Engage. Source: Popa 
et al. (2018). 
 
Figure 16. Modified Kill Chain Applicable to JF’s Research. Source: Popa et 
al. (2018). 
   
 
42 
B. JF PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS 
The proposed improvements for shortening the Joint Fires kill chain’s C2 
responsiveness include improving interoperability between the lethal triad and creating an 
effective, distributed, ad-hoc mesh network, like that shown in Figure 2, by integrating the 
following on all JF platforms by 2030 for platform commonality: 
Table 1. Proposed JCEC C2 Interoperability Improvements 
Improvement Description 
 JCEC C2  
Message Exchanges 
Incorporate high speed digital interoperability among the lethal 
triad, rather than the analog voice method, and automate the 
selection of the most effective combination of lethal triad for a 
given threat for the decision maker.  
 MADL-like 
Communications 
Incorporate anti-jamming capabilities, seamless ad-hoc 
participation entry via improved addressing schema, radio 
translation capability from one protocol to another, and high-speed 
transmission data rates for multi threat tracking and common 
situational awareness.  
 
 
The substantiation for the proposed improvements in the C2 cycle are developed 
from the examples given in Figures 8–11 in section III-B and from the writings given in 
sections III-C through F. Incorporation of these proposed improvements are found at the 
lowest levels of the proceeding capability and functional models in Figures 17–23 as 
indicated.  
The benefits of creating and using a distributed, mesh network to quickly 
reconfigure dynamic, self-organizing, ad-hoc AFPs for effectiveness have been discussed 
previously in Section II’s DMO Network Architecture Options paragraphs. It is highly 
plausible that a joint force warfighting scenario will be complex, dynamic, and have the 
potential for confusion with its many participants. A distributed mesh network is an optimal 
architecture for both communications and C2 for any joint force. It allows for the 
connection of all nodes with minimal time lost to reconfiguration due to jamming or as 
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participants join and detach from the AFP for whatever reason. In addition, long C2 cycles 
can take several minutes and diminish the effectiveness of a dynamic, quick reactionary 
AFP. These C2 cycles must traverse each service’s own decision maker before moving 
onto the higher echelon’s, joint force decision maker, as discussed in Section III. 
While the recommended improvements in Table 1 do not change the kill chain 
functions, they do improve the way in which the lethal triad conducts JCEC C2 by 
improving interoperability through MADL-like communications and JCEC C2 message 
exchanges. Of utmost importance are the effects that shortening the C2 cycle should have 
on the kill chain and the outcome of a battle. The kill chain benefits should include faster, 
less jammable communication among the lethal triad; more responsive, reliable decision 
making in a highly congested environment; and improved matching of weapon systems to 
threats which should culminate in a more appropriate and effective ad-hoc, self-forming 
AFP. 
C. CAPABILITY MODELS OF CURRENT & IMPROVED JCEC C2 
The current JF kill chain’s capability model is shown in Figure 17, and the 
improved JF kill chain’s capability model is shown in Figure 18. Table 2 offers a 
comparison of current capabilities versus improved capabilities based on Table 1’s 
proposed improvements. Figure 17 shows the first two layers as the JF kill chain which 
decompose into three major capabilities: 1) finding of threat capabilities, 2) targeting threat 
capabilities, and 3) engaging threat capabilities which decompose into the BF ISR, BF 
decision maker, and BF shooter capabilities, respectively. The BF ISR decomposes into 1) 
finding the RF threat, 2) fixing the RF threat, 3) tracking the RF threat, and 4) assessing 
battle damage of RF threats. The BF decision maker decomposes into the follow/target 
capabilities. The BF shooter decomposes into the strike/engage threat capabilities. 
Embedded within each of the BF ISR, BF DM, and BF Shooter capabilities are the 
capabilities of performing JCEC C2 interoperability which then decomposes into 1) 
performing non MADL-like communications and 2) performing analog C2 messaging as 
highlighted by colors at the lowest level of Figure 17.  




Figure 17. Capability Model for Current JF Kill Chain 
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The Joint Fires kill chain’s improved capability model is shown in Figure 18 which 
is built from the current kill chain functionality shown in Figure 16. Figure 18 shows the 
proposed improvements from Table 1, which are MADL-like communications and 
improved JCEC C2 message exchanges, and are incorporated in the last two, colored 
layers. Figure 18 does not change the kill chain capabilities, but it does improve the way 
in which the lethal triad conducts JCEC C2 while performing the kill chain functions by 
improving interoperability. The first two layers of Figure 18 indicate the JF DMO Kill 
Chain, the third layer is composed of the 1) finding the threat, 2) targeting threats, and 3) 
engaging the threats. These decompose into the fourth layer of 1) BF ISR capabilities, 2) 
BF decision maker capabilities, and 3) BF shooter capabilities. These are the platforms 
executing the kill chain and have their inputs defined in the simulation per Table 7. The 
fifth layer represents the kill chain capabilities which each platform performs and maps to 
the colored bubbles in Figure 16. Each of these capabilities is further decomposed into 
performing improved JCEC C2 interoperability on the sixth layer which then decomposes 
into 1) performing MADL-like communications capabilities and 2) performing improved 
JCEC C2 capabilities on layer seven.  




Figure 18. Capability Model for Improved JF Kill Chain 
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Table 2. Comparison of Current and Improved JCEC C2 for JF Kill Chain 
JCEC C2 Capabilities for JF Kill Chain  Current Improved 
CA.1 Finding of Threats Capabilities Standard Standard 
 CA.1.1 BF ISR Capabilities Standard Standard 
 CA.1.1.1 Find RF Threat Capabilities Standard Standard 
 CA.1.1.1.1 Perform Improved C2 CEC Interoperability Standard Improved 
 CA.1.1.1.1.1 Perform Improved C2 CEC Capability Standard Improved 
 CA.1.1.1.1.2 Perform Improved MADL-like Comms Not Supported New 
 CA.1.1.2 Fix RF Threat Capabilities Standard Standard 
 CA.1.1.2.1 Perform Improved C2C CEC 
interoperability Standard Improved 
 CA.1.1.2.1.1 Perform Improved MADL-Like Comms Not Supported New 
 CA.1.1.2.1.2 Perform Improved JCEC C2 Capabilities Standard Improved 
 CA.1.1.3 Track RF Threat Capabilities Standard Standard 
 CA.1.1.3.1 Perform Improved C2 CEC interoperability Standard Improved 
 CA.1.1.3.1.1 Perform Improved MADL-Like Comms Not Supported New 
 CA.1.1.3.1.2 Perform Improved JCEC C2 Capabilities Standard Improved 
 CA.1.1.4 Assess Battle Damage of RF threat 
capabilities Standard Standard 
 CA.1.1.4.1 Perform Improved C2 CEC interoperability Standard Improved 
 CA.1.1.4.1.1 Perform Improved MADL-Like Comms Not Supported New 
 CA.1.1.4.1.2 Perform Improved JCEC C2 Capabilities Standard Improved 
CA.2 Targeting Threats Capabilities Standard Standard 
 CA.2.1 BF Decision Maker Capabilities Standard Standard 
 CA.2.1.1 Follow/Target Threat Capabilities Standard Standard 
 CA.2.1.1.1 Perform Improved C2 CEC Interoperability Standard Improved 
 CA.2.1.1.1.1 Provide Improved BF DM/Support 
Capabilities Standard Improved 
 CA.2.1.1.1.2 Perform Improved MADL-like comms Not Supported New 
CA.3 Engaging Threats Capabilities Standard Standard 
 CA.3.1 BF Shooter Capabilities Standard Standard 
 CA.3.1.1 Strike/Engage Threat Capabilities Standard Standard 
 CA.3.1.1.1 Perform Improved C2 CEC Interoperability Standard Improved 
 CA.3.1.1.1.1 Perform Improved MADL-Like comms Not Supported New 
 CA.3.1.1.1.2 Perform Improved JCEC C2 Capabilities Standard Improved 
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D. FUNCTIONAL MODELS OF PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS 
The Joint Fires kill chain’s improved functional model is composed of the 
proceeding Figures 19–23 which represent the kill chain functionality shown in Figure 16. 
Figure 19 represents the overall functional model for the proposed improvements and is 
nine layers deep although only seven layers are shown for readability. The proposed 
functional improvements are derived from Table 1 and begin at the sixth layer with JCEC 
C2 interoperability, shown in color. While Figure 19 does not change the kill chain 
functions, it does improve the way in which the lethal triad conducts JCEC C2 by 
improving interoperability through MADL-like communications and JCEC C2 message 
exchanges.  
The first two layers of Figure 19 indicate the JF kill chain, the third layer is 
composed of: 1) finding the threat functions, 2) targeting the threat functions, and 
3) engaging the threat functions which decompose into: 1) performing BF ISR functions, 
2) performing BF decision maker functions, and 3) performing BF shooter functions, 
respectively. and correspond to the high-level boxes on the right side of Figure 16. These 
are also the platforms executing the kill chain in the simulation with their inputs in  
Table 7. The fifth layer represents the kill chain functions which each platform performs 
and maps to the colored bubbles in Figure 16. The sixth layer is where the improvements 
from Table 1 are incorporated. Each of these functions is decomposed into performing 
improved JCEC C2 interoperability which then decomposes into 1) performing MADL-
like communications functions and 2) performing improved JCEC C2 functions on layer 
seven. Functions of layers eight and nine will be explained in greater detail in the following 
Figures 20–23. 




Figure 19. Operational / Functional Model for Improved JF Kill Chain 
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Figure 20 represents the finding threat functions of the overall model in Figure 19. 
Performing BF ISR functions decomposes into performing the four major functions of 1) 
finding the threat, 2) fixing the threat, 3) tracking the threat, and 4) assessing the threat. 
Figure 20 only represents one of the four functions mentioned previously for readability. 
These four major functions correspond to the four blue bubbles in Figure 16. Each of these 
four major functions is decomposed into performing improved JCEC C2 interoperability 
which then decomposes into the proposed improvements of 1) performing the functions of 
improved MADL-like communications and 2) performing the functions of improved JCEC 
C2 exchanges. In Figure 20, JCEC C2 functions, derived from Table 1, decompose into 1) 
converting analog voice to digital data, 2) transmitting digitized readiness signal to the DM, 
and 3) transmitting digitized location data to the DM and shooter. 
The MADL-like communication functions, as derived from Table 1, will repeat 
across all four major functional areas under BF ISR but will only be decomposed and 
discussed in detail once while JCEC C2 will change across the four major functional areas 
based on the types of messages being exchanged. Proposed functional improvements for 
MADL-like communication decomposes into 1) performing BF anti-jamming, 2) 
implementing addressing schema to allow ad hoc joining of participants to the AFP, 3) 
receiving, transmitting, and updating high speed multi threat tracking data for common 
situational awareness, and 4) translating radio messages from one protocol to another. 
Providing BF anti-jamming decomposes into 1) transmitting directionally, 2) frequency 
hopping, and 3) nulling threat signals on receive. 
Figure 21 shows the major functions of 1) fixing the RF threat, 2) tracking the RF 
threat, and 3) assessing the RF threat from layer 5 of the Figure 19. Fixing the threat 
decomposes into improving the JCEC C2 interoperability which then decomposes into 1) 
performing MADL-like communications, and 2) performing improved JCEC C2. In this 
case the JCEC C2 functions, as derived from Table 1, decompose into 1) converting analog 
voice to digital data and 2) transmitting digitized CEC threat location updates to the shooter 
and DM.  
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Figure 21 further shows the major function on layer five of the functional 
decomposition as tracking the RF threat which decomposes into improving the JCEC C2 
interoperability and then into 1) performing MADL-like communications, and 2) 
performing improved JCEC C2. The JCEC C2 functions, as derived from Table 1, 
decompose into 1) converting analog voice to digital data and 2) transmitting digitized 
CEC threat location updates to the shooter and DM.  
The last major function shown in Figure 21 on layer five is assessing battle damage 
of the RF threat. Assessing battle damage functions, which are derived from Table 1, 
decomposes into improving the JCEC C2 interoperability and then decomposes into 1) 
performing MADL-like communications and 2) performing improved JCEC C2. In this 
case performing JCEC C2 decomposes into 1) converting analog voice into digital 
messages to the DM and ISR and 2) transmitting and receiving digitized BDA to and from 
the DM and shooter.
52 
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Figure 22 is a representation of targeting the threat which is the second major 
function on the third layer of the overall functional model in Figure 19. Targeting the threat 
decomposes into the performing improved BF DM functions. This in turn decomposes into 
follow/target threats and represents the yellow bubble shown in Figure 16. Figure 22 
decomposes into improving the JCEC C2 interoperability which decomposes into 1) 
performing MADL-like communications functions and 2) providing BF decision 
making/support functions.  
Proposed functional improvements, which are derived from Table 1, for MADL-
like communication decomposes into 1) performing BF anti-jamming, 2) implementing 
addressing schema to allow ad hoc joining of participants to the AFP, 3) receiving, 
transmitting, and updating high speed multi threat tracking data for common situational 
awareness, and 4) translating radio messages from one protocol to another. Providing BF 
anti-jamming decomposes into 1) transmitting directionally, 2) frequency hopping, and 3) 
nulling threat signals on receive. 
Providing BF decision making/support functions, also derived from Table 1, 
decompose into 1) converting analog voice to digital data, 2) receiving readiness signals 
from all the ISRs and shooters, 2) sending and receiving digitized CEC messages including 
shooter engagement orders, 3) processing shooter availability and inventory, and 4) 
automatically optimizing and selecting the best combination of ISR/DM/Shooter for a 
given threat.
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Figure 23 is a representation of engaging the threat functions which is the last major 
function on the third layer of the overall functional model in Figure 19. Engaging the threat 
decomposes into the performing BF shooter functions. This in turn decomposes into 
striking and engaging threats. Striking and engaging threats decomposes into improving 
JCEC C2 interoperability which in turn decomposes into the proposed functional 
improvements of 1) performing MADL-like communications and 2) performing improved 
JCEC C2.  
Proposed functional improvements which are derived from Table 1, for MADL-
like communications, decompose into 1) performing BF anti-jamming, 2) implementing 
addressing schema to allow ad hoc joining of participants to the AFP, 3) receiving, 
transmitting, and updating high speed multi threat tracking data for common situational 
awareness, and 4) translating radio messages from one protocol to another.  
Providing BF anti-jamming decomposes into 1) transmitting directionally, 2) 
frequency hopping, and 3) nulling threat signals on receive. Performing improved JCEC 
C2 functions, as derived from Table 1, decomposes into 1) converting analog voice into 
digital data, 2) transmitting readiness signals to all DMs and ISRs, 3) receiving digitized 
fire control data from the DM, and 4) transmitting digital engagement status to ISR and 
DM.
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The IDEF0 diagram for the improved JF’s kill chain is shown in Figure 24. The 
proposed JCEC C2 interoperability improvements from Table 1, are shown as part of the 
mechanisms of the IDEF0. The proposed improvements increase the responsiveness of the 
lethal triad as they conduct their interoperability functions when executing the kill chain, 
but they do not change the kill chain functions. The diagram has three major functions 
which match the kill chain functions of find, target, and engage. The inputs are on the left 
and include the red force threats coming into the find threats function using the BF ISR, 
along with the proposed JCEC C2 improvements as the mechanisms. Target location data 
is passed from the find threats function to the target threats function where the BF DM, 
along with the proposed JCEC C2 improvements as the mechanisms, decides whether to 
engage the red force threat based on controls like rules of engagement and commander’s 
intent. The fire control command is passed from the target threat function to the engage 
threat function where a BF shooter, along with the proposed JCEC C2 improvements as 
the mechanisms, engages with the red force threat if so directed. The outputs are the JF 
MOPs listed in Table 8, which include, but are not limited to, the number of BF missiles 
launched at the RF targets and the number of RF targets destroyed or disabled. The inputs, 
outputs, controls, and mechanisms directly relate to the simulation.  
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V. JOINT FIRE DMO SIMULATION 
A. SIMULATING THE JF’S DMO KILL CHAIN  
The interactions during an engagement scenario between the RF threat and the BF 
lethal triad platforms, which have integrated the JCEC C2/MADL functionality on every 
platform to create a distributed mesh, are shown in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25. Proposed Lethal Triad JCEC C2 Kill Chain Execution Thread 
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The scenario begins with shooter and ISR platforms sending their readiness signals 
to the DM. The ISR’s threat location information is then transmitted to the DM. The ISR 
platform identifies the threat, tracks the threat, and transmits the tracking data to the DM 
for automatically selecting the best combination of lethal triad based on its effectiveness 
against the threat. Based on the ISR information about the threat, the decision maker 
transmits a fire control decision to the shooter which then engages the threat. The ISR 
transmits a battle damage assessment report back to the shooter and decision maker for 
reengagement purposes. 
B. SIMULATION APPROACH AND PURPOSE 
The modeling and simulation approach is to use ExtendSim 10. This is a software 
tool that allows the team to create a force on force model to simulate different scenarios 
for exercising the assumptions and concepts of operations for an AFP. The scenario to be 
simulated is as described in the Operational Concept in section III with both the RF and 
BF locations as shown in Figures 3–7. The simulation will show the results of the BF 
engaging with the RF in both a defensive and offensive posture. The simulation should 
determine the kill chain’s percentage of increased BF survivability while comparing the 
baseline runs of current JCEC C2 implementation with the Table 1 recommended 
improvements for JCEC C2 runs.  
Simulation assumptions include the expectation that the BF will have superior 
range for detecting, finding, targeting, tracking, and engaging the RF because of the 
connectedness of remote observers. Further simulation assumptions include expectations 
that the BF platforms are better organized and trained in the cooperative engagement 
capabilities. The exact RF employment of capabilities is unknowable unless informed by 
intelligence. The BF will use notional ISR to place its platforms in locations not occupied 
by the RF. The BF is limited to identified detection ranges of its platforms.  
The platforms and munitions selected for employment by BF are current U.S. Navy 
ships and weapon systems, while RF platforms and munitions are based upon the current 
unclassified PLA-N Naval Order of Battle. Platforms are integrated based on certain 
characteristics of surface, air, and ground attributes. Platforms included primary strike 
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munitions, if capable, as well as primary air defense munitions, if capable. Each platform 
from both forces will employ one type of strike warfare munition and one type of AMD 
warfare munition, if able. The RF ability to defend against BF strike warfare is not 
measured. The RF has sufficient observation capability over the scenario space and will 
engage the BF with strike warfare munitions at their longest engagement ranges. There are 
no RF MOPs associated with their ability to coordinate strike warfare. These parameters 
are detailed in Tables 3–5. 
Table 3. RF and BF Munition Parameters. Source: Popa et al. (2018). 
 




Table 4. RF Platform Parameters. Source: Popa et al. (2018). 
 
 
Table 5. BF Platform Parameters and Sensors. Source: Popa et al. (2018). 
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Figures 26–30 show how the RF and BF are established in the simulation, how 
they are assigned munitions, the steps involved in physically placing them in the 
battlespace, and finally the dynamic interplay of platforms from both forces. The RF 
resource pool is put through a randomizer to select an aircraft, ship, or ground force. The 
RF platforms are assigned a longitude and latitude. The RF platforms target BF strike 
platforms based on proximity to each target and the distances identified. Next, the RF 
platforms have their defense munition and capacity identified. The final attribute assigned 
to the RF platform is the targeting of a BF air target. The distance to the BF air target is 
identified. This assignment process creates the RF baseline. It does this for the RF aircraft, 
sea, and ground locations. Once the RF platforms have locations, they get their assigned 
BF targets and the distance to the target. The attributes of the RF platform will be assigned 
to the munition. The munition will be assigned the platform’s location. 
The BF platforms and munitions will go through a similar process as the RF 
platforms and munitions. The BF will choose available locations from the remaining 150 
available locations. The BF platforms will receive sea, air, and ground locations. The BF 
platforms will be given a certain number of strike and air defense munitions based on their 
capacities. At the end of the setup phase, RF platforms will have assigned targets with 
associated distances. The RF munitions will be designated with range, velocity, 
probability of kill, strike target, and distance to target. The BF platforms have the same 
parameters assigned. 
Figure 26. Establishing the Red Force (RF) and the Blue Force (BF) 
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Figure 27.  Allocated Munitions to RF and BF Platforms 
Figure 28. Locations for Land-Based Platforms 





Figure 29. Assigning Location to RF and BF Platforms 
 
Figure 30. Dynamic Interplay of RF & BF Platforms and Munitions 
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The engagement phase has process markers used in the lethal triad kill-chain 
algorithm. It begins with RF munitions receiving targets assigned. This begins the 
calculation of the RF travel time in which it is the actual movement of the RF munition at 
a BF target. The BF munitions have munitions with targets assigned. There is an additional 
attribute of calculating communication time between platforms. The BF platforms engage 
targets following the JF kill chain’s proposed improvements from Table 1. The BF 
platforms have five possible capability categories and are listed in Table 6.  
Table 6. Blue Force Platform Capability Categories 
The Sensor-Strike-DM, for example, engages when it can sense, strike, and 
provide strike decision-making against the target. This engagement design is robust 
enough to incorporate additional platforms’ capability categories for future modeling 
and simulation. Based on the BF platform roles, there are process time delays outlined in 
Table 7.  
The simulation of BF munitions targeting automates the process for the DM issue 
weapons release decisions. Again, it is important to note in this model that all the BF and 
RF platforms are static. However, the BF and RF munitions have a designated velocity. 
Munition travel times and delays are based on time, distance, and proximity. This is 
addressed in a BF platform capability combination that is delineated in Table 7. The 
simulation will first perform baseline engagement scenarios using the timing in Table 7, 
column two, plus the addition of either the current JCEC C2 estimated timing shown in 
column three or the addition of improved JCEC C2 timing shown in column four.  
Blue Force Platforms Capability Categories 
Sensor /Shooter/DM 
Sensor/DM 




Sharif H. Calfee and Neil C. Rowe, while researching at The Institute for 
Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation (MOVES), modeled the cognitive 
responses of the team members of the Combat Information Center performing air defense 
operations for a U.S. Navy battle group (Calfee and Rowe 2004). This study surveyed 
many operators and averaged their inputs (Calfee and Rowe 2004). The study found that 
the decision process could take up to 30 seconds per individual making decisions when 
the situation is not of high alert, 20 seconds when the situation is balanced, and 10 seconds 
when the situation is highly stressful (Calfee and Rowe 2004).  
I.C. Moon, K.M. Carley, and T.G. Kim studied fleet success in air and missile
defense and the impacts of human decision makers in stressful environments (Moon, 
Carley, and Kim 2013). Their research indicated that typical C2 decision making delays 
range from 40 to 60 seconds (Moon, Carley, and Kim 2013). This was incorporated into 
the JF simulation by using these decision times as a normal distribution with a sample 
mean Xbar = 50 seconds and a sample standard deviation σ = 3.25 seconds, as shown 
below in Table 7’s column two, with the additions of columns three or four as appropriate. 
To represent the traditional C2 fires coordination cycles among various echelons 
of the joint force, an estimate for the delays caused by this coordination was set at Xbar = 
400 seconds and a sample standard deviation σ = 100 seconds as shown in Table 7, column 
three. In contrast, given basic calculations for radio signal transmission at the speed of 
light within the scenario space and negligible processing times for computer and 
networking systems within the system of interest, the JF team used a much smaller 
coordination delay time for corresponding joint CEC exchanges of information 
implementing Table 1 improvements. After the decision maker has authorized weapons 
release, there are no more humans in the loop, and slave mode munitions can be actuated 
remotely. This delay time is estimated at Xbar = .04 seconds with a sample standard 
deviation of σ = 0.01 seconds as shown in Table 7, column four. 




Table 7. Simulation Input Timing 




Estimated JCEC C2 
Cycle Times  
Proposed 
Improved JCEC 
C2 Cycle Times  









































VI. EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE  
A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE 
The SOI is shown in Figure 14 (Chapter IV, Section A) and focuses on the JF kill 
chain’s increased effectiveness via the proposed improvements from Table 1 (Chapter IV, 
Section B), for improving current C2 responsiveness during the kill chain execution. Of 
utmost importance are the effects that shortening the C2 cycle could have on the kill chain 
and the outcome of a battle. The kill chain benefits should include faster, less jammable 
communication between the lethal triad; more responsive, reliable decision making in a 
highly contested environment; and, improved matching of weapon systems to threats 
which should culminate in a more appropriate and effective ad hoc, self-forming BF AFP. 
These improvements are modeled in the simulation via the timing in Table 7 (Chapter V, 
Section B) by adding columns two and four together. The measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) for the BF defensive and offensive warfare 
scenarios, as described in Chapter III’s Operational Concept, are shown in Table 8.  
  




Table 8. 2030 JF MOE & MOPs 
Scenario Objective AFP Function MOE MOPs 
Conduct Blue Force 
(BF) DMO via an 
AFP to effectively 
control a strategic 
strait access by 
controlling the Red 
Force Platforms 
   
 
Employ effective 






BF Survivability and  
RF Survivability  
 
   The number of RF 
threats destroyed  
   
The number of BF 
platforms destroyed  
   The number of RF 
munitions 
neutralized 
   The number of BF 
AMD munitions 
spent 
   The number of BF 
strike munitions 
spent 
   The number of RF 
platforms that escape 
   The number of RF 
hits but not kills on 
BF  








B. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The data analysis was conducted using MS Excel and JMP. The JMP analysis of 
the simulation output data is shown in Figures 31–37 and represents analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) of the mean for a significant statistical difference. The data was collected using 
the ExtendSim10 write-to-database or information blocks. The simulation was run one 
thousand times for the baseline or Status Quo (SQ) configuration using inputs from Table 
7, column two added to column three and then again for the improved JCEC configuration 
using inputs from Table 7, column two added to column four. The simulation was 
configured such that the BF is slightly more capable than the RF. This is an important 
assumption the JF team made which directly relates to the belief that the U.S. JF has and 
will have better capabilities than any near peer adversary in the 2030 timeframe. 
The input parameters for the simulation were as follows: 1) the JCEC C2 cycle 
timing from Table 7 depending on the configuration; 2) the number of BF platforms that 
are created along with the weapons load for each platform; and, 3) the number of RF 
platforms that are created. The simulation output parameters which relate to the MOPs in 
Table 8 are shown in Table 9.  




Table 9. Simulation Output Parameters that Relate to JF MOPs 
MOP Note 
1) the number of BF 
platforms killed 
This MOP directly relates to the overall survivability of the BF 
platforms that represented the AFP in each configuration. 
2) the number of RF 
platforms killed 
This MOP directly relates to the overall survivability of the RF 
platforms. 
3) the number of RF 
munitions neutralized 
 
4) the number of BF 
AMD munitions 
spent 
This MOP may be significant as each platform forward deployed 
can only carry a limited amount of munitions.  
5) the number of BF 
strike munitions 
spent 
This MOP allowed the JF team to simulate CEC with ground or 
air platforms from the joint forces. 
6) the number of RF 
platforms that escape 
 
7) the number of RF 
hits on BF but not 
kills 
This MOP was captured to represent possible significance of 
some of the BF platforms, although being targeted and hit, still 
are able to defend themselves and continue with the mission. 




The following are the detailed findings from the simulation. 
a. Finding A: Bf Mean % Survivability 
The increase in the overall BF Platforms survivability is the result of improving 
the kill chain, via the implementation of the JCEC improvements from Table 1, using the 
C2 cycle timing from Table 7. The JF team expected to see that as the kill chain was 
accelerated by reducing the JCEC C2 cycle times, the overall BF platform’s survivability 
would increase. Figure 31 represents the BF Platforms Killed versus the SQ (0) run and 




the improved JCEC (1) run which incorporate no further decision-making improvements 
as explained in Table 12. Figure 32 represents the BF Mean % Survivability versus the 
SQ (0) run and the improved JCEC (1) run. The mean results from the figures are 
transcribed to Table 10. 
 
 
Figure 31. BF Platforms Killed  
 
 









































The overall BF Mean % Survivability in Table 10 is calculated using Equation 1 
below: 
Equation 1.  BF Mean % Survivability = [(Mean BF initial platforms – 
Mean BF Killed) / Mean BF initial platforms] x 100 
 
The JF team calculated a decrease in BF loses of 12.6 % and an overall 5.9% 
improvement in BF Mean % Survivability, as indicated in the Table 10. These results 
represent a significant savings in lives and costly platforms. Increased effectiveness of the 
BF kill chain thus represents a more survivable BF. 
 
Table 10. BF Mean % Survivability 
1000 runs each SQ(0) (mean) Improved JCEC(1) (mean) 
% Difference 
Using Eq 1. 
Mean BF Platforms 
created  10.4 10.4 
 0.44 
     
Mean BF Platforms 
Killed 3.2 2.8 
  
12.6 
     
BF Mean 





The JF team decided to simulate two different excursions with C2 cycle time 
improvements to measure the effects on the overall BF Mean % Survivability. The first 
improvement is shown as Excursion 1 in Table 11 and is representative of what could be 
achieved with extensive training of the human decision maker in order to reduce the C2 
cycle times (Calfee and Smith 2016). The second improvement shown as Excursion 2 in 
Table 11 represents what could be achieved if the JFs implemented automation using 
artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms to accelerate the C2 cycles. The 
simulation’s input SQ decision-making timing from Table 7’s column 2, is changed per 
Table 11 for Excursion 1 and then again for Excursion 2, for a total of six runs as shown 
 




in Table 13 and Figure 33 and indicated by the nomenclature SQ (0), JCEC (1), SQ (2), 
JCEC (3), SQ (4), and JCEC (5), as explained in Table 12.  
 
Table 11. DM Options in Timing for Excursions from Table 7, Column 2. 
Source: Moon, Carley, and Kim (2013). 
 
As shown in Table 12, the baseline scenario uses SQ (0) and JCEC (1) which 
represent Table 7, column 2 decision-making input timing without training or 
automation. Excursion 1 uses SQ (2) and JCEC (3) which incorporate improvements in 
decision-making timing with training of the decision maker. Excursion 2 uses SQ (4) 
and JCEC (5) which incorporate improvements in decision-making timing with 
automation implemented.  
Table 12. Explanation of SQ0, JCEC1, SQ2, JCEC3, SQ4, JCEC5 
Human Decision-Making 
Configuration & Timing 
 
Status Quo JCEC 
Configuration & Timing  
Improved JCEC 
Configuration & Timing 
Status Quo (SQ) DM, 
(See Table 7, Col 2) 
SQ (0) JCEC (1) 
Trained DM, (See Table 
11, Excursion 1) 
SQ (2) JCEC (3) 
Automated DM, (See 
Table 11, Excursion 2) 
SQ (4) JCEC (5) 
 
The differences in various mean results from Table 13 and Figure 33 offer three 
important findings. First, a near instantaneous, improved JCEC (5) capability, with 
1000 runs each 
Excursion 1- SQ Human 
Decision-Making Time 
with Training 
Excursion 2-SQ Human 
Decision-Making Time with 
Automation 
Cycle Time Mean 
Xbar 20 seconds 0.04 seconds 
   
Cycle time Std. Dev 
σ 10 seconds 0.01 seconds 
    




automated decision making, results in a 6.4% increase in survivability over the SQ (0) 
configuration with no JCEC or decision-making improvements. This represents the 
maximum improvement that could be realized in any of the configurations. Second, the 
near instantaneous, improved JCEC (5) configuration, with automated decision making, 
results in a 2.4% increase in survivability compared to the baseline, improved JCEC (1) 
configuration with no improvements in decision making. This represents the maximum 
improvement that could be realized with improved JCEC capability and automation. 
Finally, SQ (4) configuration with automated decision-making results in a 2.1% increase 
in survivability compared to the baseline SQ (0) configuration. This suggests that there 
is an approximately 2% improvement in survivability that can be realized via automation 
of just the decision-making process, without the implementation of further JCEC 
improvements. 
Table 13. BF Mean % Survivability for Excursions  
 
Level Number Mean Std Error Lower 95% Upper 95% 
SQ (0) 1000 68.9 0.35 68.1 69.5 
JCEC (1) 1000 72.8 0.35 72.1 73.5 
SQ (2) 1000 70.9 0.35 70.2 71.6 
JCEC (3) 1000 75.0 0.35 74.3 75.7 
SQ (4) 1000 71.0 0.35 70.4 71.8 
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b. Finding B: Additional Bf amd Munitions Available 
Faster C2 cycles should allow the BF to be able to fire more AMD Munitions to 
defend its platforms. The difference in the mean shown in Figure 34 and transcribed to 
Table 14 indicates that faster C2 cycle times allow the BF in the improved JCEC (1) 
configuration to fire a mean of 50.7 missiles, which is approximately 6 additional missiles 
available and fired than the SQ (0) configuration, without improvements. JCEC C2 
improvements which accelerate the kill chain, would allow for additional BF munitions 
to be available for fire, thus acting as a form of BF multiplier.  
 
 
Figure 34. Additional BF AMD Munitions Available and Spent  
 
Table 14. Additional BF AMD Munitions Available and Spent  
Level Number Mean Std Error Lower 95% Upper 95% 
SQ (0) 1000 44.5 0.42 43.7 45.3 
















Figure 35 and Table 15 indicate the results for the number of additional BF AMD 
munitions available and spent during the simulated C2 cycle time improvements while 
implementing Excursions 1 and 2 using the mean and standard deviations shown in Table 
11. The difference in mean results, indicates that the improved JCEC (5) with automated
decision- making, represents approximately 6 additional BF AMD munitions available
and fired when compared to an improved JCEC (1) with no decision-maker automation
or training. This suggests that if the JF implemented artificial intelligence and machine
learning algorithms by the year 2030, it would be able to fire on average 56.4 AMD
munitions.
The difference in mean results also indicates that the improved JCEC (5) with 
automated decision-making represents approximately 12 additional BF AMD munitions 
available and fired when compared to the current SQ (0) configuration with no 
improvements. JCEC C2 improvements which accelerate the kill chain, would allow for 
additional BF munitions to be available for fire, thus acting as a form of BF multiplier.  























0 1 2 3 4 5
SQ(0) JCEC(1), SQ1(2) JCEC1(3), SQ2(4) JCEC2(5)
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Table 15. Additional BF AMD Munitions Available and Spent for 
Excursions 
Level Number Mean Std Error Lower 95% Upper 95% 
SQ (0) 1000 44.5 0.4 43.6 45.4 
JCEC (1) 1000 50.7 0.4 49.8 51.5 
SQ (2) 1000 47.6 0.4 46.7 48.4 
JCEC (3) 1000 56.3 0.4 55.4 57.1 
SQ (4) 1000 47.8 0.4 46.9 48.6 
JCEC (5) 1000 56.4 0.4 55.5 57.2 
c. Finding C: Additional Number of Rf Munitions Neutralized
Faster C2 cycles improve the kill chain and allow the BF to be able to neutralize 
more RF munitions. More enemy RF munitions destroyed, results in a more favorable 
outcome for the BF in terms of less casualties and less damage to costly platforms. The 
differences in the mean values of Figure 36 and Table 16 below indicate the improved 
JCEC (1) configuration, with no improvements in decision making, results in 
approximately 4.6 more RF munitions destroyed than the SQ (0) configuration with no 
improvements. Faster C2 cycles shorten the kill chain and allow the BF to defend its 
platforms more promptly.  






















Table 16. Additional RF Munitions Neutralized  
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95% 
SQ (0) 1000 33.4 9.2 0.3 32.8 33.9 




Figure 37 and Table 17 indicate the results for the number of additional RF 
munitions destroyed during the simulated C2 cycle time improvements while 
implementing Excursions 1 and 2 using the mean and standard deviations shown in Table 
11. The difference in mean results, indicates that the improved JCEC (5) with automated 
decision-making, represents destruction of approximately four additional RF munitions 
when compared to an improved JCEC (1) with no decision-maker automation or training. 
The difference in mean results also indicates that the improved JCEC (5) with automated 
decision-making, represents approximately 8.7 additional RF munitions destroyed when 
compared to the current SQ (0) configuration with no improvements. JCEC C2 
improvements which accelerate the kill chain, would allow for additional RF munitions 









Figure 37. Additional RF Munition Neutralized with Excursions. 
 
Table 17. Additional RF Munitions Neutralized with Excursions 
 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95% 
SQ(0) 1000 33.4 9.2 0.3 32.8 33.9 
JCEC(1) 1000 38.0 10.7 0.3 37.4 38.7 
SQ(2) 1000 35.8 9.9 0.3 35.2 36.5 
JCEC(3) 1000 42.3 11.9 0.4 41.6 43.1 
SQ(4) 1000 35.8 10.3 0.3 35.2 36.4 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The focal point of this research is evaluating the implementation of a shorter C2 
cycle between the lethal triad to speed the kill chain. The Joint Fires team modeled the 
Table 1 improvements for shortening the JF kill chain’s JCEC C2 responsiveness, via the 
simulation input timing in Table 7 with additional improvements in human decision-
making timing further explored as excursions using training and automation as described 
in Table 11. The simulation results and analysis conclude that the proposed improvements 
to the JCEC C2 cycle, increase the BF kill chain effectiveness.  
The simulation results and analysis for the BF Mean % Survivability are shown in 
Table 18 with explanations of the SQ0, JCEC1, SQ2, JCEC3, SQ4 and JCEC5 in Table 
12. 
Table 18. BF Mean % Survivability Analysis Summary 
Without Excursion Timing With Excursion Timing 
5.9% increase in BF Survivability when 
comparing SQ0 to JCEC 1 
6.4% increase in BF survivability when 
comparing SQ0 to JCEC5 
12.6% decrease in BF loses when 
comparing SQ0 to JCEC 1 
2.4% increase in BF survivability when 
comparing JCEC5 to JCEC1 
 2% increase in BF survivability when 
comparing SQ4 to SQ0 
 
The simulation results and analysis for the additional BF AMD munitions are 
shown in Table 19 with explanations of the SQ0, JCEC1, SQ2, JCEC3, SQ4 and JCEC5 









Table 19. Additional BF AMD Munitions Available and Spent Summary 
Without Excursion Timing With Excursion Timing 
6 additional BF munitions available when 
comparing SQ0 to JCEC1 
6 additional BF munitions available when 
comparing JCEC 5 to JCEC 1 
 12 additional BF munitions available when 
comparing JCEC 5 to SQ0. 
 
The simulation results and analysis for the additional RF munitions neutralized are 
shown in Table 20 with explanations of the SQ0, JCEC1, SQ2, JCEC3, SQ4 and JCEC5 
in Table 12. 
 
Table 20. Additional RF Munitions Neutralized Summary 
Without Excursion Timing With Excursion Timing 
4.6 additional RF munitions destroyed 
when comparing SQ0 to JCEC1 
4 additional RF munitions destroyed when 
comparing JCEC 5 to JCEC 1 
 8.7 additional RF munitions destroyed 
when comparing JCEC 5 to SQ0. 
 
From the analysis it is evident that JCEC C2 improvements, which allow for the 
acceleration of the kill chain, act as a form of BF multiplier because they allow for 
additional BF munitions to be available for fire and cause additional RF munitions to be 
destroyed. The simulated data collection suggests that training individual decision-makers 
to achieve shorter C2 cycle times does improve JF kill chain responsiveness. However, 
the data shows that human decision-makers introduce significant delays into the command 
and control system that could hinder the ability of the JF to promptly react and defend 
their platforms in future conflicts, particularly against the predicted speeds of hyper 
velocity projectiles (HVP). Therefore, automating human decision making is 
recommended and supported by the analysis in Tables 18–20. 
 





The JF Team recommends pursuing the proposed improvements from Table 1 for 
shortening the JF kill chain’s C2 responsiveness which include improving interoperability 
among the lethal triad, adding automation to the human decision-making process, 
incorporating MADL-like communication, and creating a distributed, ad-hoc mesh 
network by integrating the improvements on all JF platforms by 2030. Of utmost 
importance are the effects that shortening the C2 cycle should have on the kill chain and 
the outcome of a battle. The kill chain benefits should include faster, less jammable 
communication between the lethal triad; more responsive, reliable decision making in a 
highly contested environment; and improved matching of weapon systems to threats 
which should culminate in a more appropriate and effective ad hoc, self-forming AFP. 
Human decision making is the bottleneck of the JCEC C2 and implementation of 
artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms which can aide and expedite the 
human decision-making process should be explored. The JF team further recommends 
that the joint forces carefully consider using mission engineering principles to better plan 
forward deployed force munitions loadouts for conflicts and engagements with a near peer 
adversary which has access to a shortened supply chain. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
The JF team believes that more research is needed for the development and 
integration of JCEC. There is also further research needed in ad-hoc networks and 
connectivity of the joint forces. There is an urgent need for more research in artificial 
intelligence, machine learning algorithms and their integration into the command and 
control systems. Research and development are needed to explore Adaptive Force 
Package configurations that include joint forces capable of extending the tactical span of 
control and effective mission range of the Carrier Strike Group.  
Further classified research should be conducted for a comparison effort of the 
MIDS JTRS, Link 16 versus MADL-like communications and the use of MADL for the 
creation of a JF common situational awareness. MADL-like communication may require 
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the upgrade of outdated mission processors and displays to handle the increases in 
information which MADL can provide. If cost is the prohibitive factor, then more 
platforms should be considered for implementation as Battlefield Airborne Command 
Nodes (BACN) (Burns, Kevin R. and Smith, Keith. 2016). There are opinions that 
satellites can be used to create communication links, determine adversary locations, and 
create a common situational awareness for JF, but what is the contingency plan if those 
satellites are jammed or destroyed as was the case when the South Koreans complained 
to the United Nations that North Korea was jamming its Global Positioning System (GPS) 
satellites as early as 2016 (Nichols 2016). Furthermore, evidence exists of peer adversary 
testing of a new anti-satellite weapon and of disruption of military and commercial 
navigation (Coggins 2020). However, the U.S. Space Force is working on mitigation of 
space satellite threats with the successful testing of the “Mitigation and Anti-Jam 
Enhancement” (MAJE) program (Strout 2020). Also the work being done by the Space 
Development Agency concerning the “Joint All-Domain Command and Control” 
(JADC2) mesh network will further strengthen our confidence in space satellite use 
(Strout 2020a). However, its incorporation of Link 16 versus MADL-like communications 
is an area worthy of further research. 
Research efforts concerning the speed of command, control, and communications 
needed for weapons engagement against adversarial hyper velocity projectiles is also 
another area of future concern. In a 2018 article written by Sydney Freedberg, the 
Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office was approaching the testing of a newly 
developed, ballistic, HVP which could travel at 5600 miles per hour, or Mach 7.6 
(Freedberg 2018). In a joint fires scenario, if a non MIDS, JTRS, version of Link 16 
messaging is implemented with the slowest frame rates between messages, and if 
command and control cycles are on the order of minutes, speed could become a limiting 
factor in the effectiveness of defending against such weapons.  
89 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Bach, Peter A., Shawn Brier, and Lauren E. McNeil. 2019. “Systems Engineering 
Approach to Determining the Suitability of Wireless Mesh Networks for Joint-
Fires in Distributed Maritime Operations.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/63484. 
Blanchard, Benjamin S., and Wolter J. Fabrycky. 2011. Systems Engineering and 
Analysis, 5th ed. Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall. 
Burns, Kevin R and Smith, Keith. 2016. “Battlefield Airborne Communications Node 
(BACN), Realizing the Vision of the Aerial Layered Network (ALN).” American 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc, https://arc.aiaa.org/doi/pdf/
10.2514/6.2016-0574. 
Calfee and Rowe 2004. “Multi-Agent Simulation of Human Behavior in Naval Air 
Defense.” Journal Article, Navy Engineers’ Journal. Pages 53–64. 
Coggins, Kevin. 2020. “Deploying a Backup to GPS will protect the U.S. and Spur 
Innovation.” 19 August 2020. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/08/19/
deploying-a-backup-to-gps-will-protect-the-us-and-spur-innovation/. 
Colby, Elbridge A., 2019. “Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
Hearing on Implementation of the National Defense Strategy.” January 29, 2019. 
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Colby_01-29-19.pdf. 
Corbett, Logan, Michael Enloe, William Jankowski, Erik Kelly, Gerald Kummer, Keren 
Kummer, Sarah Smith, and Scott Watson. 2017. “Command and Control for 
Distributed Lethality.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/55534. 
Department of the Army (DOA). 2000. Introduction to Tactical Digital Information Link 
J and Quick Reference Guide. NWP 6-02.5, Washington, DC: DOA. 
 https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/6-24-8/index.html. 
———. 2019a. Electronic Warfare Techniques. ATP 3-12.3. Washington, DC: DOA. 
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/
ARN18105_ATP%203-12x3%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf. 
———. 2019b. Multi-Functional Information Distribution System (MIDS) Joint Tactical 
Radio System. Washington, DC: Operational Test and Evaluation.  
90 
Department of Defense (DOD). 2018. Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the 
United States of America. DOD. Washington, DC: DOD. 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-
Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
Department of Defense Operational Test and Evaluation Directorate. 2012 Report on 
DOD Operational Testing “Multi-Functional Information Distribution System 
(MIDS) Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS).” DOD. Washington, DC: DOTE 
https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2012/dod/
2012mids.pdf?ver=2019-08-22-111645-127.  
Department of Navy. 2005. C4I Infrastructure. NTTP 6–02. Washington, DC: DON. 
January 2005. https://docplayer.net/30152726-C4i-infrastructure-nttp-6-02.html. 
———. 2013a. Maritime Operations Center. NTTP 3–32.1. Washington, DC: DON. 
April 2013. https://www.navybmr.com/study%20material/NTTP_3-32-
1_MOC_(Apr_2013).pdf. 
———. 2013b. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Radios. 
NTTP 6–02.72. Washington, DC: DON https://www.marines.mil/portals/
1/MCRP%203-40.3A%20z.pdf. 
———. 2015. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea power. DON Instruction. 
Washington, DC: DON. https://www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-CS21R-
Final.pdf. 
———. 2019. Resources and Requirements Review Board and Naval Capabilities 





Freedberg, Sydney J. 2018. “$86,000 + 5600 MPH= Hyper Velocity Missile Defense.” 
https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/86000-5600-mph-hyper-velocity-missile-
defense/. 
Geiss, Elizabeth A. 2019. “Analysis of Unmanned Surface Vessel Employment in 






Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. 1997. Warfighting. MCDP-1. Washington, 
DC: Department of the Navy. https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/
MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf. 
 
Hitchens, Theresa. 2019. “Exclusive Navy, Air Force Chiefs Agree to Work on all 




Hura, Myron, Gary W. McLeod, Eric V. Larson, James Schneider, Daniel Gonzales, 
Daniel M. Norton, Jody Jacobs et al. 2000. Interoperability: A Continuing 
Challenge in Coalition Air Operations, CH 9 Tactical Data Links. RAND, pg. 
108. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1235.html. 
 
Johnson, Bonnie W. 2019. “A Framework for Engineered Complex Adaptive Systems of 
Systems.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School. http://hdl.handle.net/
10945/63463. 
 
Johnson, Richard C. 1993. Antenna Engineering Handbook, Third Edition. Georgia 








———. 2016. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. JP 
1-02. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/
jp1_02.pdf. 
 
———. 2017. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. JP 1. Washington, 
DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/
pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf.  
 












Lockheed Martin Newsroom. 2016. “F-35 And Aegis Combat System Successfully 









Moon IC., Carley K.M., Kim T.G. 2013. “Modeling and Simulating Command and 
Control for Naval Air Defense Operation.” In: Modeling and Simulating 
Command and Control. Springer Briefs in Computer Science. Springer, London. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5037-4_3. 
 
Navy Warfare Development Command. 2011. Navy Fire Support. NWP 3-09. 





———. 2015a.Composite Warfare: Maritime Operations and the Tactical Level of War. 







———. 2015b. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Forces, Chapter 5. Adaptive 
Force Packaging and the Navy Expeditionary Combat Force. NWP 3-10. 





Nichols, Michelle. 2016. “South Korea tells UN that North Korea GPS jamming 




Ong, Chin. 2004. “Digital Phased Array Architectures for Radar and Communications 
Based on Off-the-Shelf Wireless Technologies” Master’s thesis, Naval 






Popa, Christopher H., Sydney P. Stone, Ee Hong Aw, Choon Pei Jeremy Teo, Licun 
Edwin Cai, Wai Hoe Chong, Rachel Cline, Jiesheng Jackson Hong et. al. 2018. 
“Distributed Maritime Operations and Unmanned Systems Tactical 
Employment.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School. http://hdl.handle.net/
10945/59587. 
 
Richardson, J. M. 2018. “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.” Official 
memorandum. Washington, DC: DON. https://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/
cno/Richardson/Resource/Design_2.0.pdf. 
 
Russo, Joe. 2017. “A lethal combination F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and M142 HIMARS 
sensor-to-shooter integration.” Army Fires Bulletin, November-December 2017. 
 
Schweizer, Andreas. 2017. “On Developing a Wideband BLE Sniffer.” Classy code 
(blog), June 5, 2017 https://blog.classycode.com/on-developing-a-wideband-ble-
sniffer-part-1-5db2a6a0193e. 
 








USNI NEWS. 2016. “Successful F-35, SM-6 Live Fire Test Points to Expansion in 











INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
 
